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East Asia

Southeast Asia

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STATE OF CAMBODIA

Sources Comment on Vietnamese Presence

90SE0135C Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English
11 Aug 90 p 4

[Excerpt] The fisherfolk unloading the day's catch from sampans on Cambodia's Tonle Sap River wear the conical straw hats of Vietnam. The young women with painted faces dancing with rich Cambodians in Phnom Penh's night spots are Vietnamese.

In ghettos in the capital, Vietnamese migrants driven by poverty to cross the border to their western neighbour earn a living as scrap-iron collectors, carpenters, tailors and dock workers. At night they gather in shacks to watch videos from home.

Other Vietnamese families, here before for two or three generations, have returned to Cambodia after fleeing the pogroms of the 1970-75 Lon Nol government and 1975-79 Khmer Rouge regime.

Their presence is now one of the main justifications given by Cambodia's guerrilla alliance for waging war against the government set up in Phnom Penh after invading Vietnamese troops ousted the Khmer Rouge.

Hanoi's soldiers withdrew a year ago. But the Khmer Rouge-led guerrilla alliance says the settlers form the vanguard of a continued colonisation attempt by Hanoi.

It hopes its nationalist stand will convince Cambodians to forgive the Khmer Rouge under Pol Pot for their brutal rule, during which they killed hundreds of thousands of their fellow countrymen.

"I was born here and so I came back," said a 35-year-old woman named Tie at the dockside in central Kompong Chanang town as baskets of long, silver fish were brought ashore.

Her family escaped Pol Pot's rule. They speak Vietnamese and eat Vietnamese food, but Kompong Chanang is home, she said.

Aum Sam Ouern, a provincial committee official, said 2,000 Vietnamese lived in the town of 30,000 people. More were in villages along the river bank and many transient workers came in for the fishing season.

"Khmer and Vietnamese don't mix very much," he said, although some Cambodian men had taken Vietnamese wives.

Ning Tie San, 41, who once cut the hair of American GIs in Saigon, left An Giang Province two months ago because her family was starving. She and her husband left five children at home and took two with them to seek work in Cambodia.

"It was very difficult in Vietnam," she said. Now she lives in one of Phnom Penh's several Vietnamese quarters. They are making money but she said she hoped to go home soon.

Vietnamese women work as prostitutes in the clubs and hotels frequented by Cambodia's burgeoning middle class. Khmer Rouge propaganda accuses them of importing the deadly AIDS virus.

Government officials were unable to provide figures on how many Vietnamese are in Cambodia. Relief workers and diplomats said there were hundreds of thousands, but probably no more than during the rule of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, who is now the guerrilla coalition's figurehead leader.

Many of the richer settlers who came in the past decade had returned to Vietnam fearing for their safety after the troop withdrawal, those sources said. They doubt the new poor underclass was deliberately settled by Hanoi.

Historical enmity between the two countries runs deep.

Cambodians have long feared being swallowed up in a Vietnamese-dominated Indochina federation. The annexation two centuries ago of Khmer Krom, now the Mekong Delta area of southern Vietnam, is a cornerstone of Cambodian nationalism.

They have also cooperated. Vietminh and Khmer Issarak fighters joined forces in the struggle against French rule. Sihanouk turned to the Vietnamese for help after he was deposed by Lon Nol in a 1970 coup.

In conversations Cambodians from street vendors to monks expressed a dislike of the Vietnamese, although most also made clear that their fear and hatred of the Khmer Rouge was greater.

Foreign businessmen who brought over Vietnamese consultants found they closed more doors than they opened, an aid administrator said.

Following the December, 1978, invasion, launched after the Khmer Rouge attacked villages in southern Vietnam, Hanoi built the Phnom Penh administration from scratch.

Government officials say advisers in the ministries have now left. Foreign diplomats and disgruntled government sources said some experts remained. No important ministry appointment was made without referring to Hanoi, a diplomat said. [passage omitted]

Correspondent Reports Vietnamese Presence

90SE0137A Bangkok THE NATION in English
26 Aug 90 p b6

[Article by Kim Gooi]

[Excerpt] "Vietnamese soldiers are still in Cambodia, who said they are gone?" sneered Sophie. A former soldier of the Lon Nol army, Sophie is now a withered

old man who works as a laborer in Phnom Penh, when he speaks of the Vietnamese and the Thais, both major powers who had fought repeatedly over Cambodia in the past centuries, there is anger and bitterness in his eyes. Without hesitation he said: "I will show you where they are."

Six kilometers from the town center, in the vicinity of Chamkamon Palace more than a thousand Vietnamese soldiers whom our friend said are Vietnamese troops were jogging on the road at six o'clock in the morning. Dressed in shorts and T-shirts and wearing army shoes, they jogged in unison in groups of a hundred each.

The Vietnamization of Cambodia which Prince Norodom Sihanouk and the resistance often complain about takes many forms. "We employ many Vietnamese technicians and engineers to help us. They are cheaper than Russians or East Europeans. For one Russian engineer we can employ four Vietnamese," said Chum Bunrong, director of press division of the Foreign Ministry in Phnom Penh.

"We are a poor country, we need foreign experts to develop the country. How can you charge us about Vietnamization when we employ Vietnamese personnel because they are the obvious choice," he said in a recent interview.

At Niek Luang ferry crossing, 50 kilometers southeast of Phnom Penh, hordes of Vietnamese money changers assailed visitors. Vietnamese children hawked cakes and soft drinks.

"Look at the river banks. Those clusters of nipah huts. They are all new Vietnamese settlements," said a resident of Niek Luang. "It is very easy for the Vietnamese to stay here. They just come and register with the district office and they can put up their dwellings anywhere they like. There are Vietnamese officials working side by side with the Khmers in the district office," he said.

At Bavet border crossing where national Highway 1 passes into Vietnam, a whole colony of Vietnamese huts had sprung up in the past two years. It is a smuggling haven where foreign cigarettes, liquor, beer, motorcycles, textiles and electronic goods from Singapore and Thailand are smuggled across open rice fields into Vietnam.

Thanh Minh Quanh, an ethnic Chinese trader from Cholon, Ho Chi Minh city, said he comes to Phnom Penh maybe twice a month, sometimes more frequent. He said life is very difficult in Vietnam. The best way for him to make money is to come to Phnom Penh and buy goods and smuggle them back to Vietnam. This way he can make \$20-30 a month. It is better than holding a regular job in Ho Chi Minh City, he said.

"Ten thousand Vietnamese cross the border into Cambodia everyday, some going as far as Battambang and Sisophon, depending on the type of goods you are buying. The closer to the Thai border, the cheaper are some of the goods," said Thanh.

He said the border is wide and easy to cross and the cheapest mode of transport is by boat up the Mekong River. No papers are required, the only hazard for an ethnic Chinese is to be stopped by Vietnamese border guards. "When they know we are Chinese, they will detain us for a day or two and confiscate our goods or they take money from us and let us go. Still it is worth the risk to take," the trader said.

When asked how the guards know he is an ethnic Chinese as it is impossible to differentiate him from Vietnamese, he said: "The guards are very sharp. By listening to our accent they can tell us apart. Of course, there are Chinese who speak Vietnamese like a native. They can get away without having to pay anything."

"In Cambodia we face no problem at all. It is safe on the road. No need to worry about robbery or government troops. The soldiers don't bother us. A packet of cigarettes will suffice to smoothen things. We just have to look out for thieves lurking in the cheap hotels or rest houses when we sleep," he explained.

The Vietnamese are found in big numbers all over the prime areas of Cambodia such as Kompong Chanang on the Great Lake, the world's richest fresh water fishing ground and Phnom Penh with its abundance of tax-free consumer goods.

The most visible signs of the Vietnamese presence are in the dozen night clubs in Phnom Penh where comely Vietnamese women dance and solicit among the burgeoning nouveau-rich class. Officially, there is curfew that begins at 9 pm but dancing goes on until midnight anyhow. Vietnamese domination over the less active Cambodians is best discerned in the clubs. While two years back Khmer women were the only one dancing with the men, today Vietnamese women have completely dominated the rich-picking of the nightclubs and the world's oldest profession.

Not surprisingly, government officials are unable to give figures of the Vietnamese in Cambodia. There is doubt that the Vietnamese are deliberately settled by Hanoi. It is more a natural consequence—the overflowing of a powerful and overcrowded neighbor's populace into a helpless country rich in resources and sparsely populated. [passage omitted]

Battambang Border District Conditions 'Normal' 90SE01324 Vientiane PASASON in Lao 3 Jul 90 p 3

[Text] Lovea Canton is affiliated with Bavel District of Battambang Province (Cambodia). This province was considered to be a hot spot for fighting with the Cambodian reactionaries. It is located 300 km northwest of the capital of Phnom Penh.

Starting early in the morning men in khakis appropriate for wartime rushed to plow the fields to be ready to transplant rice during the rainy season. They worked hard even though they were very tired from being on

watch all night in the village. Saba, a farmer about 30 years old, said in response to a correspondent's question that they had two duties: defending the nation and producing to maintain the standard of living. They had to keep the land secure and fight the Cambodian resistance, which primarily consisted of Pol Pot's soldiers who had come to disrupt and destroy their peaceful lives.

The sound of gunfire could still be heard occasionally. This was easy to understand when one considered that one canton was situated on the Thai-Cambodian border. Nevertheless by the middle of June almost half of the cleared land which was to be planted to rice in the rainy season this year had been plowed. Of this almost 800 hectare had been transplanted, and the rice was green. Last season the farmers of Lovea harvested almost 6,000 tons of unhusked rice. For the year the harvest averaged out to 300 kg of unhusked rice per person. What was notable was that from this land the farmers were also able to sell 1,800 tons of rice not needed for food; they used this rice to barter with the state for consumer goods and agricultural tools priced lower than those of the free market.

In the area of animal husbandry poultry was the best source of income except for rice. Some families earned up to 300,000 riel (Cambodian currency) per year raising livestock.

In Lovea everything was normal. In the child care center and nursery the children were still studying and happy to be with their teachers.

In the elementary and secondary schools of Lovea there were 2,000 students and 70 teachers last year. At the medical center for this canton the medical cadres provided injections to the people to prevent disease as normal.

The important things in the lives of the people of Lovea continued to be normal because of the defense provided by the armed guerrilla units, which were prepared at all times to respond to any infiltration by the Cambodian reactionaries.

Officials, Civilians Comment on Khmer Rouge Kompong Speu Operations

90SE0135A Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English
31 Aug 90 p 4

[Article by Jacques Bekaert: "Not Safe Staying Home"]

[Text] Oral District, Kompong Speu—"We better drive slowly," the man insisted. "The other side of the road is probably mined." And slowly we went, following several ox carts, a difficult progression with the rain transforming the dirt road into a slippery and muddy track.

The district of Oral in Kompong Speu Province was created at the end of 1985. It comprises five communes and 31 villages, and has a total population of 12,695 people. Its district headquarters is surrounded by forest

and is more than 40 kilometres from the main road, Highway 4 which links Phnom Penh to Kompong Som.

Oral district has never been easy to defend. And for years the Khmer Rouge have made Oral one of the targets of their determined psychological warfare.

Not only is access to the district headquarters difficult from the provincial capital, Kompong Speu, the Khmer Rouge also benefit from the dense forest which makes it easy for them to organise their logistics supplies coming from the Thai border through the province of Pursat, according to Eak Chy Eng, a permanent member of the district committee.

Last year was "complex," as the Khmer Rouge increased their pressure, occupied remote villages and sometimes even killed a few cadres. They also planted mines in the roads, intimidating villagers, district officials and their families. The morale of cadres and soldiers was not very good, Mr Eak admitted. Khmer Rouge soldiers, many of them recruited recently from nearby provinces, were encouraged to marry local women. It is a frequent practice with young Khmer Rouge soldiers. It provides them with a family and a network of protection and informants.

"The Khmer Rouge also told peasants not to sell their rice to the government and urged the young people to join the armies of Prince Sihanouk or Son Sann," one local official said.

"But this was a trick," Mr Eak said. Once the young people realised they were in fact enrolled in the Khmer Rouge forces and not in the Sihanoukist or the Front armies, many of them defected.

Nevertheless the overall Khmer Rouge strategy worked, said several officials in Kompong Speu.

The worst for the government came in April 1990, when communications problems and Khmer Rouge pressures became such that in May, Phnom Penh took the decision to relocate many of the villagers from Oral district.

"It was impossible for us to protect the district and guarantee the people's security," one provincial official said.

Relocation took place on June 5, combined with a large scale military operation to ensure, for a few hours at least, the protection of the population and bring them to a safer place, much closer to Highway 4.

Not all of the more than 7,000 villagers relocated from Oral were volunteers. Some officials claimed the people were in fact internal refugees. But others, noting that the decision came from Phnom Penh, said no, they were not exactly volunteers even if some of them wanted to move to a safer zone. "Some had to be forced to move," one official said.

Most people hardly had time to gather their few belongings. The vast majority of the people are peasants with

deep roots in their land and villages. To survive in the new location, they sell charcoal at the local market. "But life remains very difficult," one old woman said.

A senior Vietnamese source even said that he was sceptical of the relocation policy. It could create resentment among the population, he said.

Local officials do not deny that the authorities now face some new and serious problems. The province of Kompong Speu is poor. Not enough houses have been built. "Many of our people do not have proper shelter," one local official complained.

There are plenty of health problems too, with malaria on the rise as the rains come to Kompong Speu. The old district headquarters of Oral is now in the hands of the Khmer Rouge. In the nearby district of Phnom Sruoc the people of two communes have also been moved away in another attempt to deny the Khmer Rouge popular support.

The new district headquarters is a small fortified base, with soldiers constantly on the alert. There has so far been no direct shelling on the new headquarters, only a few distant shelling by Khmer Rouge mortars. But mines have been planted on the dirt road leading from Highway 4 to the relocation area and at night almost 200 soldiers patrol the area.

On the way back the driver of our Soviet-made jeep showed us the spot where a mine had exploded a few days earlier.

One official in Oral said that 300 to 500 Khmer Rouge guerrillas were now operating in the district alone. Why are the Khmer Rouge still so strong? One senior official in Phnom Penh believes that corruption among provincial cadres has greatly contributed to the present strength of the Khmer Rouge in Kompong Speu.

"Our people do not trust us completely anymore," the official said.

The day of our visit there was at least one good new for the people of Oral. It rained. "We should at last be able to cultivate the land," one old woman said. "Life is very harsh, we do not have enough food."

As long as there is war in Cambodia, the people of Oral have little chance to go back to their old village. And life for them will remain extremely difficult.

Correspondent, Official Comment on Kompong Speu Conditions

90SE0135B Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English
19 Aug 90 p 2

[Text] The American-built road from Phnom Penh to the provincial centre of Kompong Speu, 50 kilometres east of the capital, is still smooth and straight after nearly two decades of war. But other legacies are bitter: children play in the ruins of a bombed primary school and the

road is lined with bullet-riddled, crumbling gates. Houses that once stood behind the gates have been replaced by bamboo huts.

Today Kompong Speu remains a province at war. Sao Son, deputy chief of cabinet of the provincial committee, says the area has been under increased attacks from Khmer Rouge forces since the Vietnamese withdrawal.

They are fighting unseen and mysterious enemies, who appear in small groups and then fade into the forest and mountains, which cover two-thirds of the province.

"It is the same tactic used by Pol Pot. They mobilise their forces in one place to attack, and afterwards split into small groups. It is hard for us to find them in the forest," explains Sao Son.

As well, Khmer Rouge forces have launched attacks from the two provinces that sandwich Kompong Speu—Kompot in the south and Kompong Chhnang in the north.

Sao Son says "most of" the province's 87 communes have been attacked, and that Khmer Rouge activity especially increased in June and July on either side of the road, the north and the south; in some places they have even attacked the chief towns of the districts."

The provincial official says that every week there are reports of fighting, including a battle against 200 Khmer Rouge on May 15. He notes that the enemy has penetrated deeper inside the province. However Sao Son claims at the same time that fighting has declined since immediately after the Vietnamese withdrawal.

"We can defend and maintain our position. When we attack they have no plan for a counter-attack—that is our strong point," he says.

But still, the provincial troops are mostly fighting shadows in the forest. "Our land is too big, so we cannot cover every area. The Khmer Rouge cannot control all the forests and mountains, but it is hard to find them and they have no headquarters," Sao Son says. He is not sure how many Khmer Rouge are in Kompong Speu's eight districts, but he knows there are organised divisions of up to 200, regiments of 50 to 70 and battalions of 20 to 30.

"I think there are some more new Khmer Rouge troops coming into our province. It is hard to say the exact number because they mobilise forces from Kompot and Kompong Chhnang," he admits.

The other hidden threat is landmines. Mines have been planted along the roads, in particular along roads used by farmers. "It is difficult for our people to go to work because they don't know when they might step on a landmine."

While Sao Son denies reports of intensified fighting since April, it is clear that some districts are being evacuated. There are now 130,000 displaced persons being held in

camps countrywide, up from 20,000 in January, with the biggest increase being in Kompong Speu.

About 10 kilometres from the provincial town, on a drought-parched plain, Khim Meo, 55, shares a tiny thatch shelter with five other family members.

Khim Meo's family, from Katop Commune in Oural District, have been at O Koki Camp for two months. They brought one ox and a few household effects with them on the 40 kilometre trek. "We just took anything we could grab," she says.

There are 7,395 people in the camp. Plastic sheeting has been distributed but so far only 555 of the 1,817 families have decent shelters. There have been two rice distributions but now the rice has run out, leaving 869 people without rice since the end of July.

The Khim family has subsisted by sharing food with their neighbours, who have been able to cut and sell firewood from the surrounding brush. They have also received two allotments of rice—the second smaller than the first—one bottle of fish sauce and a kilo of sugar.

Khim Meo has been sick with fever and diarrhoea, and so has her grandson. They receive traditional medicine from the camp hospital. Despite illness and fatigue, family members must carry water from O Koki Creek, two kilometres away.

It's difficult to discern exactly what would lead people to abandon their farms for a life of such extreme hardship. Oural District chief Chum Trouk explains: "Many of them volunteered to come here. It's hard to say how many were moved by government troops."

At 4:30 a.m. on May 8 the Oural District Office was overwhelmed by 18 Khmer Rouge divisions, totalling 500 soldiers. After four hours the outnumbered defence force of 130 ran out of ammunition.

During the retreat a few refugees followed the army. "At that time not so many left. The Khmer Rouge pressured them not to come," says Chum Trouk.

In June a joint force of regular armed forces and provincial troops returned to Aural for week-long showdown. "After that we liberated the people," is the district chief's description of events. A strike force secured the area, then a second force came in to move the farmers.

The Khmer Rouge also "liberated" a share of the population, taking 300 families of more than 1,000 people deeper into their territory.

There is no longer a district office in Oural; Chum Trouk and his staff have joined their people in exile. But even the camp is not fully secure. On August 4 there was a skirmish with the Khmer Rouge 300 metres from the new district office, which is at the northern end of the camp.

Chum Trouk now must act as leader in a rapidly deteriorating environment. Additional families have been trickling into the region to join relatives and escape the fighting. Some wells have been dug, there has been a meeting about opening a school, and the provincial hospital has given assistance "but not enough," Chum Trouk reports.

International aid agencies have been hesitant to get involved beyond providing a few basics. They are unsure if the O Koki camp residents are refugees or pawns in a military strategy to cut food supplies to the Khmer Rouge.

The district chief is realistic about relying on outside help. "It is not good to wait for donations and aid." Therefore the people will plant rice themselves. One thousand hectares have been set aside, along with seedlings and 100 tonnes of fertiliser.

The idea of giving land to farmers could be seen as a matter of simple survival for desperate refugees. However some observers say the move could be part of a plan to depopulate Oural and create a permanent settlement under government control.

In any case, since May there has been no rain and now the planting season is all but gone. The farmers sit in their crude shelters cradling sick children, their heads bowed in misery.

Khim Meo's nephew Chan Leng, 18, has the yellowed eyes of a malaria victim—40 per cent of the camp residents have malaria. He speaks of the family's future in a defeated monotone. They have been told they will get a better shelter and a field, but the family did not bring farm tools with them, and day after day the sky is an unyielding blue.

Vietnam Wants Cooperation in Industrial Field

90SE0121C Jakarta ANGKATAN BERSENJATA
in Indonesian 13 Aug 90 p 1

[Text] On Thursday, August 9, at the Department of Defense and Security, Merdeka Barat Street, Jakarta, the Minister for Defense and Security L.B. Murdani, received a courtesy visit by the Vice Minister for Defense of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Lieutenant-General Dao Dinh Luyen.

During their meeting Lt. Gen. Dao Dinh Luyen conveyed to the minister for Defense and Security (Menhankam) the impressions he had gained during his week-long visit to Indonesia, which he said had impressed him very much. He went on to say that he had been happy to see the industrial installations which made use of high technology.

The visit of the vice minister of defense of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam was a follow-up to the visit some time ago of the vice chairman of the Council of Ministers, General Vo Nguyen Giap, in a cooperative effort in the industrial field made in the interest of development between [sic] the two countries.

Lt. Gen. Dao Dinh Luyen explained that military industries in his country were being directed nowadays toward meeting civilian needs. Furthermore, it was hoped that it would be possible to organize cooperation in the service industry to facilitate exploration for oil. The guest also stated that the group accompanying him on this visit comprised officers who were experts in the fields of science and technology.

The Indonesian Minister of Defense and Security took this opportunity to tell his guest that issues relating to cooperation in the industrial field had also been discussed with General Vo Nguyen Giap during the latter's visit some time ago. These issues would be pursued in more detailed discussions by a team that would subsequently be organized by the two parties.

Lt. Gen. Dao Dinh Luyen had been in Indonesia since 3 August 1990 as the guest of the secretary general of the Department of Defense and Security, Lieutenant General I.B. Sudjana. He had been given an explanation by way of a presentation concerning the task and the function of the Department of Defense and Security of the Republic of Indonesia. In addition, he made courtesy calls on the Armed Forces [ABRI] Commander, the Army chief of staff, the Navy chief of staff, and Air Force chief of staff, and the commander of the Eastern Fleet at Surabaya.

The guest also made a pilgrimage to the Kalibata National Heroes Cemetery, a tour of the ABRI Museum, Satria Mandala [Abode of Warriors], and a visit to the Taman Mini Indonesia Indah [Beautiful Indonesia in Miniature Park]. The following industries were visited and observed by the guest from Vietnam: PT Bakrie Pipe Industries, motorcycle factories, automobile factories,

the Indonesian Aircraft Company (IPTN), PT Perindustrian Angkatan Darat (Pindad, the Army Industrial Firm), and PT Perindustrian Angkatan Laut (PAL, the Navy Industrial Firm).

On Friday morning, 10 August, the guest and his party left Indonesia to return to their country; they were escorted [to the airport] by the Secretary-General of the Department of Defense and Security.

General Election 'Must Be' Safe, Smooth, Orderly

90SE0121A Jakarta MERDEKA in Indonesian
10 Aug 90 p 2

[Text] The Indonesian Army's Chief of Staff General Edi Sudradjat has stated that the implementation of the 1992 General Election and of the 1993 General Session of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) is directly related to, and will be decisive for, the continuity of the mechanism of national leadership in the next five years. And the implementation of the General Election and the meeting of the People's Consultative Assembly involve in a fundamental way the continuity of national development.

"Because of all this, the implementation of the General Election and the General Session of the MPR must be carried out safely and smoothly, and in an orderly manner - and the New Order must be the victor," asserted General Edi Sudradjat when speaking in Jakarta Thursday at the transfer of command ceremony during which Major General Wismoyo Arismunandar was inducted as commander of the Army's Strategic Command (Kostrad), replacing Major General Soegito.

According to the Chief of Staff, although Kostrad is not a unit that has assigned to it responsibility for a particular territory, it should always prepare itself and be wise, especially as regards vigilance vis-a-vis the possibility of there arising negative developments that could disturb and endanger the soundness of the constitutional system.

Kostrad, as the Army's strategic reserve unit whose duty and function is to prepare the capability of strike units whose emphasis is on the strong military professional, must, said Edi Sudradjat, be able to become a strong, reliable, and concentrated fighting unit of the defense forces.

"That is, a unit with high mobility, one that is capable of reacting quickly as a preventive force that can be set in motion throughout the Archipelago, as well as being able to react to all forms and types of threats that may arise whenever and wherever in the fatherland. This is not an easy task, but it nevertheless constitutes a challenge that has to be faced, and at the same time has to be mastered," said the Chief of Staff.

He said the capabilities that must be possessed by Kostrad, both in its units and in its individual members, constituted qualities that should always be maintained and continually upgraded. This can only be achieved by

means of activities aimed at the organized, directed, continual, and continuous development of training and development of the force.

The New Order

On this occasion Edi Sudradjat said that if one scrutinizes the pages of the history of the New Order, it will be seen that this history is very closely connected with, and moreover cannot be separated from, the service rendered by Kostrad as one of the principal forces of the New Order.

"How great was the spirit of service, and the fighting spirit, of Kostrad in protecting and defending the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution against the assault launched by the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) with its 30th of September movement," Edi Sudradjat said.

He explained that it was from the Kostrad building at No. 3 Merdeka Timur Street in Jakarta that the strategy [for overcoming the PKI onslaught] had been put together. And the orders by Major-General Suharto, the then Commander of Kostrad, in the campaign to destroy the 30th of September movement (G-30-S/PKI), had been issued from the very same place. By firmly uniting with each other, the entire Indonesian people, together with the Armed Forces (ABRI), had gone into action in various outlying places in the country for the purpose of smashing the G-30-S/PKI along with its adherents. In a relatively short time, the G-30-S/PKI had been annihilated. The Old Order Government was brought down.

This account of the historical record, according to the Chief of Staff, was delivered by him to arouse a feeling of pride on the part of Kostrad's fighting men and on the part of every member of the command as they contemplated its glorious history. But in addition to this, it was also intended to renew the unity of ABRI [Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia] with the people and the guidance of history as an absolute condition for the struggle to exalt and maintain truth and justice.

He also suggested that, for the Indonesian people, war had to be waged, and constituted for them the last resort, when it was no longer possible to trod the way of peace.

"War was endured because we loved freedom more. This attitude and view takes as its starting point, and is based upon, the philosophy of life of the Indonesian people," the chief of staff said.

He said that a feeling of security was a basic human need. For this reason, the existence of an ABRI that is strong and always prepared remains an absolute requirement if the existence of the nation and its people are to be guaranteed. Consequently the people can carry on their lives knowing that they are safe in the midst of an international situation still marked by various conflicts and wars.

The Seventeenth Kostrad Commander

The Kostrad transfer of command ceremony was witnessed by former Vice President Umar Wirahadikusumah and other former Kostrad elders: Lt-Gen (Ret) Soeweno, Maj-Gen (Ret) A Kemal Idris, and Maj-Gen (Ret) Wiyogo Atmodarminto, as well as other high-ranking ABRI officers. Wismoyo Arismunandar assumes command as the seventeenth Kostrad commander since the formation of this strategic force in 1961. Born at Bondowoso, East Java, on 19 February 1940, Wismoyo Arismunandar is the first man from the 1963 graduating class of the National Military Academy at Magelang to hold a key post in Kostrad.

The first Kostrad commander, from 1961 to 1965, was Maj-Gen Suharto, who is now President of Indonesia. The second commander, from 1965 to 1967, was Maj-Gen Umar Hadikusumah [as published], who later became Suharto's Vice President (1982-1987). He was followed by Maj-Gen A Kamal Idris [as published].

Wismoyo commenced his military career in 1965 as commanding officer of an Army Parachute Commando Regiment platoon. He was then entrusted with command of the President's Personal Guard (1966-1968). He later held the post of commander of the Parachute Commandos (Parako) (1978-1982). In 1983, he was appointed Commanding General of the Army Special Forces (Kopasandha), now called Kopassus. After three years in this post, he was appointed Chief of Staff of the Udayana Military Region in Bali.

In 1987, Wismoyo, who at the time held the rank of Brigadier-General, was appointed Commander of the Eighth (Trikora) Military Region in Irian Jaya. Then he was transferred to Central Java as Commander of the Fourth (Diponegoro) Military Region, with the rank of Major-General. He held this command until he was given command of Kostrad.

As for Maj-Gen Soegito, who is going to be assigned the post of Territorial Assistant at ABRI Headquarters, although his tenure as Kostrad commander has been relatively short, he is nevertheless rated as an Army leader who has successfully completed his assignment and discharged his responsibilities in leading Kostrad.

When asked his opinion concerning regeneration in the body of Kostrad, especially in relation to the trust that has been given by the ABRI leadership to Wismoyo as a member of the generation responsible for continuing the fulfillment of the national aspirations [generasi penerus], Soegito said, "It is true, of course, that he is of the younger generation. But he, like me when I began to serve as Kostrad commander, is already 50 years old."

With reference to the challenges faced by Kostrad in the days ahead, Soegito said he agreed with the chief of staff's expectation that Kostrad members will continue to increase their professionalism by means of the guided, continuous, development of training and development of the force as a whole.

Report on Transmigrants in East Kalimantan

90SE0121B Jakarta *SUARA PEMBARUAN*
in Indonesian 10 Aug 90 p 6

[Text] The transmigrants at Teluk Dalam, Mahakam current (30 km from Samarinda, East Kalimantan), are no longer a group of "recipients of allocations of basic necessities." A very great change has occurred after ten years of their being settled at the above-mentioned location.

These transmigrants are now able to "provide the necessities of life" to the people of East Kalimantan. At the beginning they were only "recipients of allocations of basic necessities," such as rice, salted fish, cooking oil, and other items distributed to them by the government.

The Regional Office for East Kalimantan of the Department of Transmigration has confirmed that the transmigrant farmers of Teluk Dalam have now become suppliers of soybeans, maize, edible tubers, as well as vegetables, to the most important urban centers in East Kalimantan, such as Samarinda, Balik Papan, Bontang, etc.

Their harvests are large enough to meet the needs of the people of East Kalimantan, and at times they even produce a surplus, said officials of the Regional Transmigration Office when KNI [the Indonesian National News Agency] and the BERITA YUDHA daily, who visited the transmigration site last Sunday, met with them.

The harvests resulting from their cultivation, together with their private business undertakings, have, over a period of ten years, markedly affected the level of well-being of the inhabitants; that is, from being people who didn't have anything they have become people who are able to "give," and who live reasonably well, said the Head of the Regional Transmigration Office, Simatupang.

Furthermore, the headman of Mbangunrejo Village, Achmad Tukilan, said that at the present time about 25 percent of his village's inhabitants have become rich. (Mbangunrejo is one of the villages at the Teluk Dalam Transmigration site, and has a population of 700 families.)

The criterion for defining the term "rich," according to headman Tukilan, is whether an inhabitant has a television set, a motorcycle, and a taxi (a minibus used for public transportation within a town or as transportation from village to town). An additional criterion is whether each child in a family has a bicycle on which to ride to school, said Tukilan.

New Houses

According to KNI's observations, the "prosperity" that Village Chief Tukilan had in mind is indeed supported by the reality that is clearly visible in the village.

Among other things, there are the following facts: All the houses that were built by the Department of Transmigration ten years ago (in 1980) have now been replaced by houses that are much bigger than the original dwellings.

The new houses that were built with the sweat of the transmigrants themselves generally have roofs made of galvanized iron, shingles, and tiles (these tiles were produced by several farmer-entrepreneurs right there in Mbangunrejo village).

Almost every plot of land (plots in the yards of individual dwellings and first-stage enterprise plots) in the village are utilized entirely for plants. No empty plots are to be seen. The whole village is green with plants.

The total population of the village, which at the outset had fewer than 500 families, has now reached 700 families. Relatives in Java continue to arrive in a steady stream at Teluk Dalam, because of the power of attraction exerted by the economy of the village.

Mbangunrejo village headman Tukilan went on to say that their crops certainly do sell well in the markets of Samarinda (population 300,000 families), Balikpapan, Bontan, etc. The buyers come to the village of their own free will.

The price of young maize is now "10,000 rupiah a bag," and 100 bags can be produced every day during the two-and-a-half-month harvest season.

Soybeans bring 800 rupiah a kilogram, sweet potatoes 200 rupiah a kilogram. Each hectare of land can produce 16 metric tons of sweet potatoes, he said, and this was confirmed by local residents.

Among the inhabitants there are those who have opened shops with a daily sales turnover of 150,000 rupiah. The goods that are sold range from the necessities of daily life to beer and other canned drinks.

There are also people who run transportation firms that carry people from the village to town, and transportation firms in Samarinda.

One of the villagers, named Siswanto (26), a second-generation resident of this transmigration village, mentioned that among the children of transmigrants in the village there were already some who had begun to enter institutions of higher education. His own younger brother, Suprio, had just completed his studies at an Economics High School and was still considering whether he should commence looking for work straightaway or continue his education, said Siswanto.

A Coal Mine

Village economic activity at the Teluk Dalam settlement has been quite impressive, especially after a coal mine commenced operations at Teluk Dalam.

According to village headman Tukilan, many of the inhabitants have become laborers with this firm. Mban-gunrejo village has become a bustling place because it has become a stopover for people on their way to other villages and to the mining site.

The headman, responding to a question, said that yes, the coal mine was situated on transmigration land (second-stage enterprise land that was still covered with forest or bushes). But the inhabitants had no objection to this, since every hectare brought compensation of 1.6 million rupiah, he said.

According to him, coal deposits in the area would continue to be sought and, when found, would be mined. There were now hundreds of hectares of coal deposits in Teluk Dalam where mining had begun.

The taking of transmigrants' land for mining operations was not a problem for the inhabitants, because they received appropriate compensation, and new land for farming could still be found, Tukilan said. The only problem was the holes or gullies left by the excavations.

These holes or gullies were rather deep and the soil was no longer covered with plants. It would be a good idea if Kitadin, Inc., the owner of the mine, were to fill in the

diggings, because it was felt that they disturbed the environment, said the headman.

Not All Are Successful

Among the transmigration sites in East Kalimantan, it is, of course, a fact that not all have been as successful as Teluk Dalam. In a book published by the Regional Transmigration Office, it is stated that there are seven UPTs [Transmigration Settlement Units] in this region whose development has thus far not yet been handed over to the regional government (which represents the Home Affairs Department). But as a matter of fact the Department of Transmigration has been in charge of developing them for more than five years.

The delay in handing over responsibility for development was because, among other things, the soil was sandy, etc. For example, the Salimbutu settlements, I, II, and III, where people were settled from 1982 through 1986. The number of families there is around 1,100. So their development is still in the hands of the Department of Transmigration.

The Teluk Dalam site itself was settled in 1980/1981, and responsibility for it was scheduled to be handed over in five years, that is, in 1985. So far there have been 55 UPTs in East Kalimantan that have been handed over to the regional government.

USSR-Aided Bridge in Champassak*90SE0133C Vientiane PASASON in Lao 7 Jul 90 p 1*

[Text] The Sedone Bridge in Pakse District of Champassak Province, which meets international standards for load bearing, was begun in 1987 with over a billion kip in assistance funds from the Soviet government and over 800 million kip in funds from the Lao government. The No. 1 Bridge and Road Construction Enterprise of the Lao Ministry of Transportation, Posts and Construction together with a number of Soviet experts received the contract to build the bridge, which is 255 meters long and 11 meters wide. It also has 1 meter wide sidewalks on either side. At present the construction project is 90 percent complete, and it is expected to be 100 percent complete and to have been presented to the people of Champassak Province to use by the end of this year.

Further Report on EEC, FRG, French Aid Projects*90SE0133E Vientiane PASASON in Lao 11 Jul 90 p 1*

[Excerpts] The project for small-scale development of the countryside in Luang Prabang has received a grant of aid from the EEC valued at \$7.2 million. The project got underway in July.

It was designed to help steadily improve the living standard of the people in the countryside of Luang Prabang Province. It consisted of road construction in the mountain areas, encouraging agriculture such as planting long-lived fruit trees in order to create a fixed means of making a living so as to end slash and burn agriculture, and construction of schools, hospitals and systems for clean water. The project was also to build systems to prevent erosion, provide hydroelectric power and provide irrigation on a small scale in suitable areas. It was scheduled to be completed in five years. The NEDECO Company from Holland received the construction contract while the actual work was to be done by Luang Prabang Province. The Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations was to coordinate the project through the Lao project head, whom the ministry would appoint. He would inspect all stages of the construction.

Project equipment such as four landrovers has arrived in the Vientiane Municipality already. The other heavy equipment has begun to arrive.

In order to make the actual conduct of the project effective, the Luang Prabang project team held a ceremony on 5 July to officially start the project. Those present included Mr. Kithong Vongsai, the deputy minister of foreign economic relations and chairman of the International Commission for the Mekong River. [passage omitted]

It was stated that in addition to this development project, France would in the future provide funds to help rebuild the hydroelectric dam on the Dong River and the FRG would provide funds to help rebuild the municipal water system of Luang Prabang Province. The EEC, in addition to providing funds for the project to develop-

the countryside of Luang Prabang Province, would also provide aid for the pumps of the Nam Ngum area irrigation project in Vientiane Province valued at \$6.1 million. This project was to begin at the end of the rainy season in 1990.

Swedish Aid Project in Luang Prabang*90SE0133B Vientiane PASASON in Lao 4 Jul 90 p 2*

[Excerpt] Mr. Bouahong Phannousi, the director of the joint Lao-Swedish experimental project for ending slash and burn agriculture which was affiliated with the environmental protection organization of central authority's Forestry Department, helped the PASASON correspondents in every possible way. They were given the opportunity to observe the project as it was just getting underway in one area (Thongkhang) located about 60 km southwest of the Luang Prabang Municipality.

This project has been supported by more than 11 million in Lao funds and \$902,000 in funds from the Swedish Aid Organization. In 1989 the project built three housing units for cadres and workers valued at 13 million kip and built a 6 km road into the project valued at 7 million kip.

In the past this project has experimented with raising 18 different types of vegetables including Chinese cabbage, cabbage and others. They harvested more than 2 tons. At the same time the project gradually planted trees in the mountain areas in order to progress toward fixed dry field farming. This joint Lao-Swedish project to end slash and burn agriculture and change to fixed dry field farming in this area of Luang Prabang (Thongkhang) included 12,000 hectare and 14 villages with 3,647 inhabitants. These people were mostly Lao Theung, of whom there were more than 1,600. There were only 80 Hmong. They had been engaged in slash and burn agriculture for decades, which caused the green forest land in the river valleys and mountains to be destroyed and the streams to dry up. Dozens of ridges and mountains were treeless. Many places had become forests of cogon grass and brush. Trees had no chance to sprout.

Starting in September 1989 the project cadres and workers prepared 76 plots for tree seedlings. They raised 18,000 khomfat seedlings, 2,000 Kanthin-gnak seedlings and 700 dokkhekao seedlings. In the past year the project has raised 28,000 seedlings. According to project plans for this year they will strive to plant trees on 20 hectare. By the middle of June they had already planted 15 hectare. The planting was to be done intermixed with the dry rice fields of the people. [passage omitted]

Shipping Corporation's Foreign Ties Noted*90SE0133D Vientiane PASASON in Lao 10 Jul 90 p 2*

[Excerpt] The Lao Marine Shipping Corporation is a small enterprise just being set up. As far as experience and expertise, they are just starting. If it were rice farming, they would just be clearing the land.

This corporation was set up on 20 April, 1989 and did its first shipping business on 15 May 1989.

From then until the end of 1989 the corporation made six trips carrying various cargoes: it made two trips from Vinh, Vietnam, to Thailand, it made two trips from Ho Chi Minh City to Hong Kong, it made one trip from Haiphong to Thailand, and it made one trip from Ho Chi Minh City to Singapore. The cargoes carried included logs, finished lumber, steel rod, burlap bags, wheat and sugar. These goods totalled 6,479 cubic meters and weighed 5,200 tons. They earned a total income of \$299,181. The gross profit was \$107,000, and the net income was \$58,850.

From the beginning of 1990 until the end of April the corporation has shipped 850 cubic meters of logs, 718 cubic meters of consumer goods, and 1,400 tons of cement, which has earned additional income.

According to a report of Mr. Onta Thipvongsai, the director of the Lao Marine Shipping Corporation, in order to assure economic benefits the corporation signed agreements with Hong Kong, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. It did this to be in accord with international shipping regulations.

In addition to conducting business, the corporation repaired and expanded the sleeping quarters to 20 bunks. They also painted the ship and changed it to Lao ownership which made the international community recognize that Laos also had a role in marine shipping.

In the seven months preceding March 1990 the corporation conducted a class for ship's pilots. There were 10 who took the class. [passage omitted]

Smuggling on Cambodian Border Noted

*90SE0133F Vientiane VIENTIANE MAI in Lao
12 Jul 90 p 1*

[Text] Last month customs officials in Champassak Province seized goods smuggled from Cambodia and Thailand worth almost 20 million kip.

The goods seized from opportunists trying to avoid customs duties included 770 cases of beer cans, 19 color and black and white television sets, and a certain amount of medicine.

The customs officials also reported that in the past five months they had seized more than 38 million kip worth of goods from merchants trying to avoid customs. These goods consisted of beer in cans, foreign cigarettes, and many other things.

Mineral Exploitation, Exports, Potential

90SE0133A Vientiane PASASON in Lao 3 Jul 90 p 2

[Report by Thamongsak Vongsakda: "Our Mines"]

[Excerpt] Our country has abundant mineral and water resources, but there have not yet been serious attempts to survey for them or exploit them because we lack many things, such as capital, technology, vehicles, and tools etc. to continue exploration.

In any case we have surveyed and exploited more mines, and this has achieved some more income for the national budget. For example there is a gypsum mine located near kilometer marker 60 in the eastern part of Savannakhet Province. It produces 90,000 tons per year of which 90 percent is shipped to Vietnam along highway No. 9. Production from this mine will be steadily increased. For example in 1995 its production will be 180,000 tons, and in the year 2000 its production will be 300,000 tons. As for tin production Khammouan Province has been able to produce 500 tons. But if there were sufficient vehicles and tools, the factory there could produce 1,500 to 2,000 tons per year.

The coal mine at Bo Chan in Vientiane Province, because it lacks vehicles, can produce only 1,500 tons per year. If it had sufficient investment, this mine could produce 15,000 tons per year. [passage omitted]

New Bank Established in Savannakhet

*BK0509105990 Vientiane KPL in English
0903 GMT 5 Sep 90*

[Text] Vientiane, Sept 5 (KPL)—Savannakhet Province recently established a bank known as "Lao Mai Bank," having its branches in Savannakhet Municipality itself and in Khammouane Province.

This bank operates as both a trade and development bank. It is the sixth bank established in the country for the same purpose.

It also introduces credits to producers and business dealers as support for socioeconomic development.

Mahathir Offers Country as Venezuelan Trade Center

90SE0127C Kuala Lumpur *BERITA HARIAN*
in *Malay* 4 Aug 90 p 5

[Text] Caracas, 3 Aug (BERNAMA)—On Thursday night [2 August], Datuk Sri Dr. Mahathir Mohamad invited members of the Venezuelan business and industrial community who want to expand their trade to the Asia-Pacific region to make Malaysia their center.

He said that many companies from the leading industrialized countries have identified Malaysia as a site for expanding their markets to the region and as a center from which to export their goods to the advanced countries of Europe.

Speaking to members of the Venezuelan business and industrial community at a dinner held for him by foremost Venezuelan conglomerate Diego Cisneros Organization, the prime minister outlined several factors that contribute to the encouraging investment situation in Malaysia.

These factors include political stability, economic strength, efficient administration, trained and responsive manpower, high productivity, modern infrastructure, and an efficient banking and monetary system.

"Malaysia also offers a tariff package and a number of export incentives. We also offer a quality of life that is attractive to both foreigners and Malaysians," he said.

Datuk Sri Dr. Mahathir, accompanied by Datuk Sri Datin Paduka Dr. Siti Hasmah Mohamad Ali, arrived here on Wednesday [1 August] for a 5-day official visit to Venezuela.

The prime minister said that Malaysia is able to face the challenges of the 1990's by playing a more important role in the export-based manufacturing sector.

The country is now moving toward a high-technology industrial era, not only in the electrical and electronics sector, but also in production based on natural resources.

He said the Malaysian engineering sector will also experience high-technology growth in precision engineering and heavy industry, as demonstrated by the success of the Malaysian car, the Proton Saga.

The prime minister said the manufacturing sector's contribution to Malaysian export earnings has been growing since 1989.

Today, manufacturing provides the largest export income of all the sectors. Last year, its export income was 36 billion ringgit, or 54 percent of all exports.

"Manufacturing exports have surpassed commodities and petroleum," he said.

Two Countries Agree on Cooperation

90SE0127B Kuala Lumpur *UTUSAN MALAYSIA*
in *Malay* 4 Aug 90 p 4

[Text] Caracas, 3 Aug (BERNAMA)—Malaysia and Venezuela have agreed to increase cooperation in a number of sectors for their mutual benefit.

The agreement was reached after a private meeting on Thursday [2 August] between Prime Minister Datuk Sri Dr. Mahathir Mohamad and President Carlos Andres Perez at the presidential palace "Miraflores."

Datuk Sri Dr. Mahathir, who is on a 5-day official visit to Venezuela, told Malaysian reporters here that he is happy with the decision.

The sectors identified for special cooperation are trade, petroleum, finance, science, and technology.

Earlier, Datuk Sri Dr. Mahathir attended a working meeting of the Southern Commission, which discussed the commission's final report. The report is to be issued officially on Friday morning [3 August].

The meeting was also attended by President Perez, Southern Commission Chairman Dr. Julius Nyerere, and foreign ministers, or their representatives, of countries belonging to the Group of 15 (G-15).

The prime minister also lunched with President Perez at Miraflores Palace.

Former Venezuelan President Dr. Rafael Caldera later called on the prime minister in his room at the Caracas Hotel.

In the evening, the prime minister was special guest at a dinner held by a foremost Venezuelan conglomerate, the Diego Cisneros Organization.

No New Parties, Says Deputy Prime Minister

90SE0126B Kuala Lumpur *UTUSAN MALAYSIA*
in *Malay* 6 Aug 90 p 2

[Text] Kuala Lumpur, 5 Aug—Ghafar Baba advises communal groups that support the National Front (BN) not to form any more new parties but to join existing BN component parties.

The deputy prime minister said there are enough component parties now and that they represent the various communal groups.

"The present 11 BN component parties are adequate and represent all communal groups. This does not mean, however, that the BN will reduce the size of its present membership. I propose that the matter be left to the BN Supreme Council," he said.

When asked by reporters whether the BN will accept individuals who support the BN but do not want to be members of component parties, Ghafar said the proposal is a good one and will be presented to the BN.

Ghafar then referred to a reporter's question regarding the time when the Alliance Direct Membership Organization accepted members who were not themselves members of Alliance components.

He noted that if all small communal groups—whether in Sabah, Sarawak, or the Peninsula—formed their own parties and joined the BN, there would be problems during and after elections.

Problems could include distribution of seats, Executive Committee membership, and the selection of prime minister and deputy prime minister, all of which would hinder the formation of a strong government.

Ghafar said this when asked to comment further on his proposal that the current number of BN component parties be maintained or reduced in order to avoid problems that might arise from demands by the parties.

In statements he made today while inaugurating the 28th Telegu Association Conference at MIC [Malaysian Indian Congress] Headquarters here, he said it would be better for communal groups that support the BN to join existing component parties.

He said the question of positions is not left entirely up to the communal groups, for it is important that leaders be acceptable to the public.

As for the Education Act, Ghafar said the Council of Ministers will decide on the membership of the National Education Consultative Council when the ministers meet next week following the prime minister's return from overseas.

Ghafar said the Council of Ministers' meeting that he chaired last week approved the formation of the council, because the ministers do not want the next generation to be the victim of people who politicize the Education Act.

He believes that the creation of a council like the National Economic Consultative Council (MAPEN) will not complicate the situation if all members have a Malaysian spirit.

Ghafar envisions council membership as including opposition parties as well as the academic community.

Ghafar said the government is willing to study the MAPEN report despite the fact that DAP [Democratic Action Party] withdrew without giving any reason.

He also said that the Education Act and the Post-1990 National Economic Policy will be presented to Parliament regardless of when the general election is held.

Ghafar said earlier in his speech that the government does not want to make any mistakes in revising the Education Act, since the act will have much effect on the future generations that will lead the country.

Ghafar also emphasized that the present government will maintain the Constitution, including its provisions

for freedom of religion, despite one party's claim that the Constitution was created by colonial powers and is the work of infidels.

"I have challenged that party to submit a constitution; but it refuses, saying that it will reveal its constitution after it assumes power," he said.

Does Not Dare

According to Ghafar, that party actually does not dare to reveal the kind of constitution it would draft, because the party would not receive much support.

The deputy prime minister also guaranteed that he will use his position for the sake of the poor.

He said that, although he does not have a university education, education itself is not enough for leading this multiracial society. The right views and decisions are the important things.

Ghafar said he will take to the cabinet the Telegu Association's requests for a 100,000-ringgit grant, Senate representation, a higher quota for university admissions, and more Telegu broadcasts on radio and television.

The conference held two periods of meditation before the inauguration began.

The first was in remembrance of the late Tun Hussein Onn. During the second minute, delegates and others in attendance stood to remember Mina victims, the late Kartini (Ghafar's daughter), and all Malaysians who have died this year.

Speculation on Musa Hitam's Future

90SE0139B Kuala Lumpur UTUSAN MALAYSIA
in Malay 24 Aug 90 p 3

[Article by Khalid Mohd.: "Datuk Musa Hitam's Last Good-bye?"]

[Text] Without drama or excitement, Datuk Musa Hitam has announced his withdrawal from politics.

He said it so simply that most newspapers missed the "announcement."

After yesterday winning his libel suit against Syed Hussein Alattas (author of the book "Challenger—Who Opposes Whom?"), he said in English to reporters, "It is a nice wrap-up to my political career."

UTUSAN correspondents faced a problem in translating the sentence, since Datuk Musa's actual intent was hard to determine.

Finally, the sentence was translated to read, "This is the best termination of my political career."

It is true. Datuk Musa, former UMNO [United Malays National Organizational] deputy president and former

deputy prime minister, has completely departed from the political arena because of "current developments."

He left Kuala Lumpur last night for London and Oslo to attend a United Nations meeting before returning to New York to resume his duties as special Malaysian ambassador.

Four questions now arise:

- Will he run in the upcoming general election?
- Will he run for any post at the UMNO [United Malays National Organization] General Assembly in November?
- Will he retain his post as president of an UMNO division?
- And, will he participate in the election campaign?

Observers believe that Datuk Musa's departure this time is his last good-bye.

For Datuk Musa, politics are over.

Knowing Datuk Musa's style, however, it is hard to believe that he actually does not want to be involved in politics, which have been his flesh and blood.

Make Status Clear

If it is true that he is doing this, he has the responsibility to clarify his true status to his still numerous supporters and followers in Johor.

Leaving them to wonder is not a wise action. They have long waited and wondered, and they should not be left still waiting and wondering.

The fact that Datuk Musa intentionally has not been candid in this matter, one so important to Johor and national politics, raises merely one question: Is he actually leaving politics?

If he is in fact serious, the former UMNO deputy president is also responsible to explain why he made this decision.

Is the decision one that he desires, or are there other factors that compel him to take this step?

Datuk Musa naturally understands that his supporters and followers need enough information from him to enable them to continue their respective struggles in UMNO without him.

Has Datuk Musa chosen to focus his attention on his work as a diplomat with the hope of ultimately gaining greater responsibility at the United Nations?

His followers need an answer, for they must decide whom they will support as Johor's leader at the national level—Tan Sri Muhyiddin? Datuk Shahrir? or Datuk Mohamed Rahmat?

The Johor political arena is wide open, unless Datuk Musa again changes his mind.

Mahathir Criticizes DAP for Leaving Economic Council

90SE0139A Kuala Lumpur UTUSAN MALAYSIA in Malay 23 Aug 90 p 2

[Text] Kuala Lumpur, 22 Aug (BERNAMA)—The Democratic Action Party (DAP) and proponents of Chinese education chose to leave the National Economic Consultative Council (MAPEN) because they have no formula for post-1990 economic policy, according to Datuk Sri Dr. Mahathir Mohamad. He says their action will draw direct criticism from the public.

"They are good only at criticizing but cannot do anything positive or constructive at all," he said at a Malaysian Harvard Club dinner tonight.

The subject of his speech was "Malaysian Economic Policy After 1990."

Reviewing the background of the New Economic Policy (DEB), which expires this year, he said that whether we like it or not there is a price to be paid for this socioeconomic experiment, which is neither socialistic nor capitalistic.

"We feel that we have paid a low price for the DEB as a socioeconomic mechanism when we see the much higher price we would have paid had we focused entirely on economic growth without considering the sensitivities of communal groups," he added.

"In fact, the government still feels it has no monopoly on wisdom. Therefore, the government has brought together in MAPEN many critics and supporters in order that they may together draw up a post-1990 policy."

"An agreement is important, because we are trying to avoid doing injustice to any group. If they cannot agree, the government will draft the policy itself, for the government has strong support," he added.

"Because DAP denounces the government for not listening to its views, it clearly is unwilling to adapt its desires to the rights of others," he said.

Datuk Sri Dr. Mahathir also said that DAP and proponents of Chinese education apparently claim a monopoly on wisdom.

"By choosing to resign, they feel they will be free to criticize and denounce any decision MAPEN may make and, naturally, anything the government may do."

"They believe their narrow political objectives are more important than national interests," the prime minister said.

Chinese Community Leaders Seen Joining DAP

90SE0146B Selangor SIN CHEW JIT POH in Chinese 21 Aug 90 p 31

[Text] Last Friday seven Chinese community leaders joined the Democratic Action Party [DAP] en bloc. Well

known persons included Lin Huang-sheng, K'o Chia-sun, Li Wan-ch'ien, Wu Wei-hsiang, Yang P'ei-ken, and Jao Jen-i. According to their announcement, they represent a "vanguard," and as time goes by more Chinese educators and community leaders will join the DAP.

The alliance of Chinese community leaders with the DAP is bound to strengthen the momentum of the opposition party in the forthcoming general election, and will hurt, to one degree or another, the ruling parties, particularly the Malaysian Chinese Association and the Gerakan. Consequently, the DAP and the opposition party front naturally welcomed them with open arms, while leaders of the parties in power made strongly worded statements of condemnation. Such a counterproductive reaction was to be expected.

The ceremony at which the Chinese community leaders entered the party was rather impressive. High ranking leaders of the DAP, important personages from the Semangat '46 and the Parti Rakyat, as well as some leaders of the Malaysian Chinese Association, 300 people in all, attended the ceremony. The importance with which the opposition party viewed this group of Chinese community leaders, and the hopes that many members of Chinese organizations pinned on them were evident.

At the same time, however, the actions of these Chinese community leaders came under severe criticism from national front leaders. Deputy Prime Minister Abdul Shafar Baba condemned DAP's playing up to Chinese community leaders as a politicization of the education issue that will create future racial antagonisms. He said that this move made solely to advance the development of Chinese education, the Malayans could also form a bloc to uphold educational policies beneficial to Malayans. The head of the Malaysian Chinese Association, Datuk Seri Ling Liang Sik, also criticized the DAP's action in soliciting Chinese community leaders to join the party as a plot to "use the Chinese to control the Chinese." He is of the opinion that the Parti Islam and Semangat '46 is directing this plot from behind the scenes.

Although the above statements of leaders are directed against the DAP, they may easily arouse hidden worries and apprehensions among the people at large. We hope that leaders of both the ruling parties and the opposition parties will bear in mind the national interest and restrain themselves on this issue so as to avoid racializing the entire issue and creating tensions in race relations.

Actually, citizen participation in political parties and elections is a most ordinary matter. However, because of deliberate exaggerations on the part of certain parties concerned, the political participation of Chinese community leaders aroused discussion among people in all walks of life a month ago, and even provoked a certain amount of controversy within Chinese organizations

themselves. This has to be regarded as a matter for regret as far as the Chinese community is concerned.

According to the statements of Chinese community leaders, their purpose in allying with the DAP was to strengthen the opposition parties' united front in a desire to bring about a more perfect system of checks and balances, thereby strengthening the country's democratic system. They believe that only by strengthening the opposition parties to bring about a bipartisan system can the democratic system in Malaysia have true meaning.

Malaysia is a parliamentary democracy in which participation in politics and in elections are citizens' rights, and the choice of what legal political party they will join is also a citizen's right. The leaders of the Chinese community are no exception.

The Chinese community leaders selected the present time to join the DAP because they saw that the emergence of Semangat '46, and the formation of an embryo opposition party front with the possibility of breaking the national front's holding of a two-thirds majority of seats in the national legislature has already occurred.

In other words, it was with the ideal in mind of "promoting bipartisanship" that these leaders of the Chinese community entered politics. Ideals are ideals, but objective circumstances do not necessarily develop in the way that people subjectively desire. Can they unswervingly adhere to this idea from beginning to end? Will they follow the same old disastrous road taken by the Chinese educators who entered politics in 1982? We believe that these are some of the worries of those who oppose the entry into politics of the Chinese community leaders.

The general election is approaching ever nearer. DAP Secretary Lim Kit Siang has already announced that some of the Chinese community leaders who recently entered the party will represent the DAP in the general election.

Will these Chinese community leaders be able to stir up a "Chinese education" whirlwind such as occurred in 1982? Will the electorate accept them? Is "bipartisanship" a desert mirage at the present stage? The forthcoming general election will provide the best test. Even if the electorate is confused and makes the wrong choices when the time comes, history will render a verdict.

Association's Response to Opportunities Questioned

90SE0146A Selangor SIN CHEW JIT POH in Chinese
16 Aug 90 p 27

[Article by Hsu Yuan-lung: "A Detached Look at How the Malaysian Chinese Association Will Get Started Again"]

[Text] Dr. Ling Liang Sik, the head of the Malaysian Chinese Association [MCA], said: "The 90's will be the decade in which the MCA gets started again."

The dust has now settled from the new elections in the MCA, the Malaysian Youth Association, and the Malaysian Chinese Women's Organization. The faction in power headed by Ling Liang Sik controls the central committees of the three organizations, while the faction headed by Lee Kim Sai, has lost out becoming people that have no future!

Before the election, the MCA central Committee published a reconciliation order (providing no competition for the top six positions in the party, maintaining the status quo), but the party central committee election demonstrated one incontrovertible fact, namely that the two factions in the MCA may be together but not reconciled to each other.

A Second Wen-han

In the life and death struggle between the Ling faction and the Lee faction, Ling Liang Sik holds firm control over the three organizations, and now the question is how will he will deal with future events in order to avert the complications resulting from yet another election.

Lee Kim Sai controls five positions in the new central committee, namely his own position as deputy, and that of assistant association chairmen Yun Shih-chin and Yap Pian Hon, and central committee members Woon See Chin and Ch'en I-ch'iao.

With such a line-up, what is the central committee to do with a MCA in which there are as many factions as there are colors in the rainbow? Will it be frozen out?

In Malaysia, everyone concerned about MCA political developments knows that MCA party quarrels during the past 40 years have not been over party reform, but rather a fight over Chinese community rights and interests.

Precedents in which the ruling faction in the MCA has removed dissidents have been too numerous to mention. One does not have to go any farther back than former association director Li San-ch'un to find such a precedent. His elbowing aside of He Wen-han, the acting deputy may be said to have been a special accomplishment, and one that became a classic in the history of the MCA's party history.

Datuk He Wenhan's misfortune, and the subsequent case of Datuk Tseng Yung-sen who would "rather die standing up than live kneeling down" makes people wonder whether Datuk Lee Kim Sai might not follow in their footsteps, becoming a number two man in name but not in reality. This is a hot topic that those who care about the MCA watch closely.

Grim Test

Following the MCA election, director Ling Liang Sik called upon all members to let bygones be bygones and unite as one.

What course was to be followed after the MCA election? How many people were no longer officials and how

many had acceded to officialdom were the matters about which both factions were concerned.

Without doubt, both sides lost in the last MCA election and "inside news" about association chairman Ling Liang Sik's ouster is sure to become a hot topic of discussion among opposition parties in the forthcoming general election.

The first campaign following the MCA's election should be the country's forthcoming eighth general election, but the first test will be whether a spirit of loving the party and letting bygones be bygones will be possible.

The MCA's selection of candidates to run in the various states will provide a glimpse at how well the Ling and the Lee factions cooperate with each other. However, one point causing Ling Liang Sik the worst headache is pleasing one group of people only to alienate another. If he parts company with his political enemies and selects his own people, that will be regarded as rooting out dissenters and may result in his candidates being defeated in the general election. If he pacifies his party enemies, that will inevitably arouse dissatisfaction among party comrades. So that is the predicament he is in.

Elimination of internal wrangling is just the first step for the MCA. The next one is the grim and merciless test it will face in the general election.

We know that the electoral districts assigned to an overwhelming majority of high ranking leaders of the MCA are electoral districts in which the Malay electorate predominates.

At one time, these electoral districts were deemed to be safe districts, but the situation has changed with the passage of time, and the political climate is vastly different. Since the split in the United Malays National Organization [UMNO], Semangat '46 now enjoys a certain amount of strength in electoral districts in peninsular Malaysia. Under these circumstances, the support that the MCA is striving for is clearly among Chinese groups rather than UMNO groups. This means that not only do they have to rely on the vainglorious National Front title to win support of the Malay electorate, but they also have to rely on the votes of the Chinese in order to get through the election smoothly.

The Chinese Vote

If the MCA is to obtain support from people of Chinese descent, what does it have to do?

In the eyes of the National Front UMNO, the Chinese are the luckiest people in the world, but the people of Chinese descent maintain that although they are citizens of Malaysia, are unswervingly loyal to Malaysia, respect the laws of Malaysia, and are responsible citizens of Malaysia, they have a sense of being disregarded in the nation building process, and in the political, economic, cultural and educational affairs of the country. They are

frequently regarded as immigrants by the fraternal races, that their loyalty is doubted....

That the Chinese in Malaysia are in a political, economic, cultural, and educational predicament is a matter that cannot be disregarded by those who care about the country.

The MCA usually regards these major problems perplexing the Chinese community as "administrative errors." Are they "administrative errors" or are they brought about by the law? And who is in the cabinet, the national legislature, state legislatures, and even county legislatures that supports the passage of these laws? Who should bear full responsibility?

How many years has the MCA supported the passage of their so-called "administrative errors" bills in state legislatures and county legislatures, and the loudest opposition voice outside the legislature (Education Minister Anwar Ibrahim)? Thus, day after day and year after year, the administrative errors have not been corrected. The insatiable encroachment and the insatiable avariciousness at very many times fills people with despair and hopelessness.

We insignificant little people sometimes feel truly puzzled because although the MCA is a self-acclaimed representative of the people of Chinese descent, many times during their dialogues and exchanges with groups in society, it is as though they know nothing about the desires and feelings of the Chinese community, or do not understand them. Why is this?

Such actions make them a laughing stock, because leading cadres at all levels in the MCA are well known at the local level. They have close relations with grassroots party members and Chinese communities, so how can they not know the desires and feelings of the Chinese community (when members of the MCA should themselves understand better than the common people the effects of various laws and the political situation)?

The MCA bears a heavy responsibility in representing the Chinese. Just how will the MCAs new leaders headed by Ling Liang Sik guide the 500,000 MCA members in making a new start? Do they have the qualifications and the skill to make a new start?

Sworn To Make a New Start

To a certain extent, the present political environment in Malaysia may be conducive to the MCA's creation of factors favoring the making of a new beginning. A specific example is cooperation with the country's opposition party coalition in challenging the National Front. Such an opposition force would be bound to exert powerful pressure on the National Front's UMNO in most states.

In this battle, I believe that the dominance in the national legislature that the National Front now enjoys in holding an overwhelming majority of seats would be

overturned. If popular sentiment has reached the stage of desiring a major change, the possibility that a new ruling party may emerge in the country exists.

A democratic tide is running in the international political climate in every corner of the world today, which is not very favorable for the ruling parties in every country.

The electorate of Chinese descent in Malaysia will play a crucial role in the forthcoming general election. Whether the UMNO candidates can get elected in mixed Malay-Chinese electoral districts will depend on whom the electorate of Chinese descent supports.

Should the long held thinking of the UMNO that has disregarded the shock strength of Chinese political power change? They seem to believe that the Chinese electorate will continue to support their rule, and regard this as desirable. Will the Chinese support them? We will know when the results of the election are in.

That fact that the UMNO candidates will have to rely on the Chinese vote in some electoral districts is the greatest difficulty the organization has faced since the founding of the country.

Will the MCA be willing or dare to use this favorable factor to urge the UMNO to change its policies toward other than Bumiputras, bow to the desires of the people of Chinese race to allow citizens of Chinese race to enter the mainstream of development in all fields, or allow compatriots of Chinese race to have good opportunities to get ahead, jointly building the motherland into a rich and powerful newly rising country?

The crux of the MCA's desire to make a new start lies in whether it can improve the political, economic, cultural and educational plight of the Chinese.

We know that the MCA has become accustomed to the cozy life of "holding office without holding power." Will it be able to think of being the master of its own affairs, or will it want to await charity and alms from others?

When will the MCA get started again? When will it see the light? When will it get out of the abyss of misery? We will have to wait and see.

Chinese Community Leaders Urged to Join Opposition Parties

90SE0138B Selangor SIN CHEW JIT POH in Chinese
9 Aug 90 p 29

[Article by Ch'iao Kang: "Chinese Community Group Leaders Join Opposition Parties"]

[Text] According to newspaper reports, as the general election draws near, some Chinese community group and Chinese education personages are trying to change their fighting tactics. They plan to act as the developing situation requires, plunge directly into party politics, and take real actions to promote the formation of a two party system.

The speeches of different Chinese community groups and Chinese educational leaders such as Lu T'ing-yu, Master Ch'en Yu-hsin, Dr. K'o Jia-sun, and Dr. Chuang Ti-chun on the education issue, which were made at education forums from the central, northern, and southern parts of the country, which were held at the behest of the Democratic Action Party [DAP], show the trend of developments on this matter.

Once Chinese groups and Chinese educational leaders took part in political life with Barrister Kuo Mo-chen and Dr. Hsu Tzu-ken, "the pair of dragons sending forth pearls," blazing the way in 1982, others have followed in their footsteps. Today, not only are Kuo and Hsu in the Gerakan, but Barrister Wang T'ien-ch'ing and Dr. Chiang Chen-ch'eng are in it as well. In the Malaysian Chinese Association are Dr. Ch'en Tsu-p'ai, Master Lai Kuan-fu, and Dr. Ts'ai Wei-yen. Therefore, before the general election, if civil rights elements get into the DAP on a personal basis, that will not be strange. This is because scholars participation in government has become a common practice. In the parties and in the parties out of power, each person has his own aspirations!

Sensitivity and Subjective Bias

So long as their usefulness in government is affirmed, each person should be free and have the right to choose his own political party, which should not be a matter for discussion by others. However, recently some leaders of the Chinese community have made veiled criticisms of whether certain persons in the Chinese community should join opposition parties, and they have put forward many different opinions. These Chinese community leaders feel as follows:

(1) The Chinese community has always maintained a stand of keeping out of political parties. If Chinese community people, including scholars and important civil rights personages, joined an opposition party, that might produce the mistaken notion that Chinese community organizations were all dissatisfied with the government and in favor of the opposition party people.

(2) The time is not yet ripe to promote a two party system. The country still lacks an opposition party with the qualifications, the organization, and the discipline; therefore, during the present period of transition, Chinese community persons or members of the teachers' movement should not act rashly. They should not join the opposition party camp without careful consideration.

(3) Some members of the Chinese community, particularly hardcore elements in civil rights committees within Chinese organizations, are prepared to make trouble during the forthcoming election. They plan to use the name of the Chinese community to overthrow the "general election declaration" in order to pave the way for their own elevation to official positions. These people actually should not foist their own desires on the majority.

Overall, the foregoing views show that the Chinese community leaders concerned either are too sensitive about opposition parties, or hold subjective biases against scholars who want to take part in politics. It appears that the foregoing three reasons have not been convincing for the following reasons:

(1) If some members of the "Chinese community want to take part in politics, they must first resign from the various important positions they hold in Chinese community organizations, the teachers' movement, and the civil rights committees, and then join an opposition party as an individual. Thereafter, all their words and actions will be unrelated to either Chinese community organizations on the teachers' movement. Those who have no intention of taking part in politics, and who continue to remain as leaders in Chinese community organizations, must continue to adhere to a clear-cut stand of "keeping away from political parties, but not keeping away from government." Thus, no problem exists of Chinese community organization leaders favoring opposition parties, so there is no way for those concerned to gain a mistaken feeling.

(2) During the general election of 1986, both Chinese community organization and teachers' movement leaders began to preach a two party system as a means of bringing about a balancing function under the democratic political system. However, the Chinese community was extremely fearful because of the Parti Islam [Pas] Islamic country concept. As a result, an opposition coalition front between the DAP and the Parti Islam could not be formed, and the idea of the two party system finally expired. Given the objective political climate at that time, a two party system was like the ravings of a lunatic. It was not possible in the near future and totally unrealizable.

However, the political situation has greatly changed today. The political mainstream, the United Malay National Organization [UMNO], is split giving rise to the "Semangat 46." For those who preached a two party system, it is truly a heaven-sent opportunity and the chance of a lifetime. If the birth of an opposition camp is not induced now, when will it be induced?

Join an Opposition Party and Forfeit the Possibility of an Official Position

Although people say that people in the opposition party are leavings of not very good quality, and that most of the leaders of the "Semangat 46," in particular, are frustrated members of the UMNO whose personal image leaves something to be desired, and that even if the DAP cooperates with "Semangat 46," they will be unable to form a powerful opposition; nevertheless, in the absence of any better choice, this combination is already considered to be an embryonic opposition such as is difficult to come by.

It is because the people in the opposition party are leavings that many capable and courageous members of Chinese community organizations are needed in order to

uplift the image and the quality of the opposition party members. Members of Chinese community organizations want to join opposition parties at this time. They obviously feel that the time is ripe to push for a two party system "on the basis of intuition and a sense of mission" (to use the language of important civil rights members). They are already duty-bound not to turn back!

(3) If members of Chinese community organizations join the ruling parties in power, one might say they are taking a short cut to high office; however, if they join an opposition party, not only will they not rise to officialdom, but one misstep and they might be detained in a camp, "their names posted"!

If one says that these people have to pave the way in order to rise to officialdom, and that it is very possible that they, like some other people who were formerly detained in camps, may change course and head toward the seats of power, and "once they reach the pinnacle of power, their status will be enhanced a hundred fold!" So, why hold fast to one's own conviction and tread the bramble-strewn opposition party road?

Must Stand for Election as an Individual

No matter what, those members of Chinese community groups who want to join opposition parties must resign from Chinese community group organizations at once and make clear that they are running as individuals. Under no circumstances may they participate in party politics under a dual identity if they are to avoid ill will for "using Chinese community groups to fish in troubled waters."

Many people have an attitude of staying at a respectful distance from opposition parties. This is particularly true of the worldly wise and play-it-safe intellectuals who are more prone to regard opposition parties as a great scourge, and who want to avoid conflict. What they do not know is that in democratic countries opposition parties have a check and balance function, which is a healthy development in the democratic system. Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir had the following to say on this subject:

"We believe that the reason our country is ruled so well is that we have opposition parties!"

Obviously, even the prime minister himself had to admit the powerful role that opposition parties play in a democratic political system.

The former "Mr. Opposition Party," Dr. Ch'en Chih-ch'in, and the present "ordinary person representative," Mr. Li Lin-t'ai are both outstanding opposition party members who were highly respected by persons in both parties in power and parties out of power. This shows that so long as one has a correct and enlightened attitude of government service, and comports himself in a poised and serious manner, actively playing a role as an opposition party person, no one need worry about joining an opposition party.

A Means of Improving the Quality of Both in and out of Power Parties

Only if more gifted and responsible people join opposition parties will the quality of the opposition parties be improved. Once the quality of the opposition parties improves, this is bound to cause a further improvement in the quality of the ruling party. Therefore, over the long run, the participation in opposition parties of individual Chinese from Chinese community groups will play a positive role whether in inducting the birth of a two party system or in improving the democratic political system. Leaders of Chinese community groups need not worry about members of the Chinese community joining opposition parties.

Sabah Forms State, Federal Relations Committee

90SE0127D Kuala Lumpur *BERITA HARIAN*
in *Malay* 9 Aug 90 p 20

[Text] Kota Kinabalu, 8 Aug—Sabah Chief Minister Datuk Joseph Pairin Kitingan today announced that the State Government has established a Committee on State and Federal Relations for the purpose of further strengthening such relations.

He stated that the formation of this committee reflects the true desire of the State Government to have even closer ties with the Federal Government.

"We truly want to eliminate every prejudice and misunderstanding," he said to reporters following a swearing-in ceremony for 54 members of the Sabah State Legislature, including six who were appointed today.

Datuk Pairin said the committee will always cooperate with the federal secretary for Sabah so that relations can be strengthened.

He said the committee will have a role in a number of sectors that relate to the State and Central Governments.

The main purpose of the committee, he said, is to assure that Sabah has no problem in maintaining good relations with the Federal Government.

"We also hope that federally funded development projects in Sabah will move more smoothly and quickly.

"Overall, we want to strengthen every aspect of our ties so that Sabah's rights will be protected," he stated.

Datuk Pairin said that with the creation of this committee he hopes every prejudice and misunderstanding about current conditions in Sabah can be eradicated.

The important thing, he said, is for the State Government to take positive steps to assure that good relations are maintained.

The Committee on State and Federal Relations will be chaired by Datuk Pairin himself. His deputy will be Datuk Bernard Dompolok, who is also deputy chief minister.

Advocacy of Racism During Coming Election Opposed

90SE0138A Selangor SIN CHEW JIT POH in Chinese
6 Aug 90 p 27

[Article: "Do Not Stir Up the Race Issue Again"]

[Text] As the entire country approaches the general election, the parties in and out of power are about to do battle, and are readying themselves to break through to victory in the coming elections. Under the country's current racial parties political system, the United Malays National Organization [UMNO], the Malaysian Chinese Association [MCA], and the Malaysian Indian Congress represent different racial communities and have joined together to form the National Front, which has consistently held national political power. Ever since disputes between the parties in and out of power surfaced in 1990, the "racial issue" seems to have stealthily become a topic attracting the attention of personages of different political persuasions. We are apprehensive lest the racially sensitive issues that came to the fore in past elections might reappear during the present election.

Ever since the teachers' movement and important officials in Chinese organization made a political bid, widespread interest and discussion has occurred among the Chinese community, and the National Front must unavoidably face a powerful challenge from the opposition in the forthcoming general election. The pre-election publicity campaign that both the parties in power and those out of power have launched in advance of the election is normal in a democratic political system. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that since the whirlpool of political dispute between the parties in and out of power widened in 1990, the "racial issue" has the possibility of involving into a sensitive point of contention that political circles will be unable to solve. Some regard this issue as a gambit for preservation of their own authority, and some apply it in an offensive effort to expand their power. Faced with the secret worry that racial factors might become inflamed, both the Yang di-Pertuan Agong and Prime Minister Datuk Seri Mahathir Mohamad long ago emphasized that harmony and unity among the races must be maintained to insure the country's prosperity and social tranquillity. They hoped that outsiders would not again stir up racial issues. The sincere words of His Majesty and the Prime Minister merit our deep thought and serve to make us vigilant.

Therefore, we must earnestly call upon those political personages who have recently become involved, either consciously or unconsciously, in racial contention to halt at once their further use of racial topics either in self-defense or offense, and exercise a little more political logic and social responsibility. They should avoid stirring up long dormant racial feelings among the public, and avoid exaggerating their political seriousness.

In a recent television interview, Minister of Education Anwar Ibrahim spoke glowingly about the work of

drafting an education laws. He said that the government's abolition of article 21 (and 22) of the 1961 education law was not a knuckling under to pressure from any race, much less was it an abandonment of another racial group's struggle principles. Thus, he called upon all parties to study the full significance of the above draft once the government made it public, and not to take it out of context so as to avoid arousing tensions over race relations. For a long time, the Chinese community, which wants to safeguard education in its mother tongue, and to insure no change ever in the position of the Chinese minority, has called for the abolition of this law. The present government's response in compliance with popular sentiment, although faulty in places, should continue to be improved through the education consultation council. No appeal should be made to racial feelings.

We believe that real racial differences are being gradually blurred in all fields of social life, and that the public in general is ordinarily no longer so fussy and sensitive about racial topics. Anyone who wants to incite racial conflicts again will be unable to gain public sympathy, and will meet with public rejection. We maintain very great confidence about progress in blending Malaysian society, and about efforts among the people themselves to transcend racial conflicts. However, we are apprehensive that over the long haul, unless racial conflicts from top to bottom are promptly contained, they may become hidden worries and obstacles to the independence and the harmonious development of the entire country no matter from which racial community the conflicts come, and no matter whether from the ruling political parties or the opposition parties. This is not a future prospect that we wish to see.

Today, we share a common homeland in which we should mingle as one. There is positively no room for we and they groups. Particularly at a time when the country is doing its utmost to develop industry, we should work together with one heart and not permit conflicts to spread. Should any political personages or political parties play with racial epithets and sow racial dissension for personal political gain, they should be firmly condemned and rejected by all the people.

UMNO Leader Criticizes Spirit of '46

90SE0127A Kuala Lumpur BERITA HARIAN
in Malay 6 Aug 90 p 18

[Text] Petaling Jaya, 5 Aug—Datuk Sri Sanusi Junid said the Spirit of '46 Party under the leadership of Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah is not a party that defends Malays but instead wrecks their future within their own country.

He said this is because their struggle is very different from that of UMNO [United Malays National Organization]. When UMNO was formed in 1946, it focused its struggle on eliminating colonial rule.

"UMNO was established in 1946 to drive out the British, but what is the Spirit of '46 for?" he asked today as he spoke at an information course held here by Selangor UMNO.

He said the opposition parties have "run out of capital" because they have no national issues to hurl at the government.

He said they cannot make issues of subjects like the Proton Saga and the Pulau Pinang Bridge, because the people have learned the value of these projects and their benefits to the country.

"The opposition parties are attacking the government with merely personal issues," he said.

Datuk Sri Sanusi, who is a member of the UMNO Supreme Council, outlined three things UMNO members can do to defeat their opponents.

First, the party mechanism must resolve issues professionally and avoid hasty action.

Second, UMNO members need to examine opposition party allegations to learn why the opposition does not support the government and UMNO.

"This is not an easy job, for it requires time and patience and must be done honestly," he stated.

Third, all UMNO leaders and members of every division and branch need to examine themselves and maintain good relationships with everyone.

MIC Expects 40,000 More Members

90SE0126C Kuala Lumpur UTUSAN MALAYSIA
in Malay 4 Aug 90 p 7

[Text] Muar, 3 Aug—As many as 40,000 new members will join the MIC [Malaysian Indian Congress] by the end of this month, bringing total membership to 420,000, MIC President Datuk Samy Vellu claimed yesterday.

He said the MIC will thus be the only party representing the country's Indian community and will have attracted 80 percent of the community's voters to the party.

Speaking to reporters after meeting with the leaders of 10-house committees from the area's four MIC divisions, he said MIC now has 385,000 members, including 25,000 new members whose applications were accepted yesterday.

The meeting took place at the UMNO [United Malays National Organization] Pagoh Division Building auditorium on Petri Street here. About 400 MIC leaders from the Pagoh, Bakri, Ledang, and Muar Divisions attended.

Datuk Sri Samy, who is also minister of manpower, telecommunications, and posts, is confident that 80

percent of the 513,000 Indian voters will join the MIC and help to keep all National Front seats held by the party.

With regard to his party's strategy for the next general election, he said he will visit each district throughout the country to meet the heads of all MIC divisional 10-house committees.

National Front Promises Jobs, Housing for All

90SE0126A Kuala Lumpur UTUSAN MALAYSIA
in Malay 7 Aug 90 p 2

[Text] Pulau Pinang, 6 Aug—If the National Front wins again, its government will make sure that people have enough homes, schools, and jobs, Deputy Prime Minister Ghafar Baba said today.

"We have laid plans not only for the next five years, but for the 10 years up to the year 2000 as well," he declared.

The objective of the next general election will be not only to elect certain individuals but to save the people, Ghafar said late this afternoon at Bayan Lepas in a meeting held by the UMNO [United Malays National Organization] Balik Pulau Division so that leaders could meet the public.

He said the National Front Government is willing to accept from opposition parties any good suggestion for the benefit of the country and the people if the parties are still not happy with the government's plans for advancement.

He said that so far the opposition parties have merely criticized government plans but have not said what things should be done.

With regard to opposition intentions to have a People's Socialist Party candidate run for the Balik Pulau seat in Parliament, Ghafar said the socialist ideology, which is still found here and in Johor, is obsolete.

He said even the East European countries that formerly adhered to socialism discarded it after leaders could not produce the desired progress for their countries.

Countries that practice socialism, he added, control all businesses. We, however, like all the democratic nations, leave all public corporations to the people. This has been found to be more profitable, as in the cases of the Telekom Corporation and MAS [Malaysian Airlines].

Touching on cooperation among the opposition parties, the deputy prime minister said he is confident that PAS [Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party], Spirit of '46, and DAP [Democratic Action Party], which have made an agreement, will find it difficult to depend on Tengku Razaleigh's claim that the distribution of seats among the parties for the next election has been finalized.

Senate President Salonga Recommends Privatizing Subic

90SE0130A *Manila MANILA CHRONICLE* in English
26 Aug 90 p 6

[Text] Privatization or transfer of the Subic Naval Base to Filipino hands is one of several proposals that have been aired by Senate President Jovito R. Salonga to end the current impasse over the fate of the six U.S. military bases in the Philippines.

Salonga presented this proposal at a recent University of the Philippines forum jointly sponsored by the Institute for Studies in Asian Church and Culture and the Inter-Varsity Christian Fellowship.

Salonga said that privatization would require 60 percent Filipino and 40 percent foreign capitalization. The hiring of foreign technical experts would be considered, he said.

The Senate President said that Filipino base workers would also benefit more from a Filipino-controlled corporation than from an American-controlled firm.

According to Salonga, ambassador to the U.S., Emmanuel Pelaez had told him that "subject to refinement" of his formula, the U.S. may consent.

Salonga agreed with the views of another forum speaker, UP president Jose A. Abueva, on the feasibility of alternative uses—like commercial or industrial—for the bases.

Salonga, however, said that such conversion should be carried out before the RP-U.S. Military Bases Agreement expires on September 16, 1991. He ruled out the possibility of extending the joint-use scheme beyond 1991, pointing to the anti-bases mood of the Senate, where a two-thirds majority vote is required to approve a treaty extending the bases' stay.

But Salonga did not discount the possibility that the Senate majority may reverse its stand. "Madalas mag-bago ang isip ng tao, lalo na [tungkol] sa bases [It's easy to change the thinking of the people, especially on the bases]," he said.

Salonga stressed that privatization would be an effective means of eliminating the presence of foreign troops, facilities and nuclear arms in Subic, while retaining the bases' usefulness to both Filipinos and Americans.

Abueva said that privatization of Subic would be in consonance with the conversion program of the government. He said that under this plan, prepared by a committee he chairs with congressmen as members, the private sector was expected to initiate the conversion of the base lands, with the government providing only the infrastructure.

Salonga called the presence of the U.S. bases in the country "unnatural" and likened the U.S. to an intruder

who has entered a friend's kitchen with guns and explosives. This scenario, he said, negates whatever "special relations" the two countries may now have.

Salonga reiterated his stand that the bases must go in September 1991, after which, he said, no foreign bases should be allowed on Philippine soil except under a treaty. He, however, added that if the Senate did not see any need for a new bases treaty, the people should not be bothered with the tedious process of ratification.

Salonga said he does not believe the U.S. will enter into any treaty on the bases but instead opt for an executive agreement.

He cited the 1947 Military Bases Agreement, which was ratified in the Philippines, but was regarded by the U.S. as a mere government-to-government agreement. The treaty granted the Americans 99 years of rent-free use of the bases. But the Ramos-Rusk Agreement in 1966, which transferred sovereignty over the bases to the Philippines, shortened the U.S. presence to 25 years, or up to 1991. American officials, however, maintain that the agreement expires in 1992.

Some 90 percent of the Clark Base lands and 70 percent of the Subic Naval Base have since been returned to the Philippines. Salonga urged the Government to make full use of these reverted lands right away.

He enumerated three options left for the Philippines regarding the bases:

Unilateral and immediate abrogation of the RP-U.S. bases agreement as demanded by the extreme Left.

Allowing automatic extension of the agreement by not serving the notice of termination—an academic stand because the government had served the notice on the U.S. in May this year.

Compliance with the Constitutional mandate disallowing any foreign military bases beyond September 16, 1991, an option preferred by Salonga.

He said the conversion should not dislocate Filipino base workers or disrupt the economy.

Salonga also touched on the U.S. plan to transfer its military facilities to Guam. He said this could minimize the displacement if the Filipino bases workers would also be transferred to Guam.

Cardinal Sin Criticizes Government's Foreign Debt Policy

90SE0130B *Manila MANILA CHRONICLE* in English
25 Aug 90 p 1

[Text] Manila Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin yesterday backed calls to limit the country's foreign debt payments, saying it was morally wrong to put debt servicing before basic human needs.

"Something, indeed, seems morally wrong when in the face of such widespread lack of basic necessities among our people, we still feel compelled to service our debts in a 'business as usual' manner," Sin said in his homily at a Manila Cathedral memorial mass for the victims of the July 16 earthquake.

He also hinted his support for selective debt repudiation by calling on the government to distinguish between debts that have been "incurred legitimately" and those "incurred by fraud."

Citing a Vatican document on international debt, Sin said that debt servicing "cannot be met at the price of the asphyxiation of a country's economy, and no government can morally demand of its people privations incompatible with human dignity."

He said that the Vatican recognized there were limits to the ability of some countries to service their foreign debts.

"There is moral obligation to respect the contract obligations of the debtor, not the creditor—especially when the latter involves the payment of some \$300,000 daily in interest alone," Sin added, alluding to the daily payments for the mothballed \$2.1-billion Bataan Nuclear Power Plant.

Sin complained that with the government spending "gigantic sums" for "the interests of fraudulent loans," there is not much left to service the "legitimate interests" of the poor.

President Aquino, who attended the same mass, sat silently through the entire homily and afterwards, refused to comment on Sin's suggestion.

Mrs. Aquino has resisted demands, especially from the Senate, to put a moratorium on debt payments for at least two years to allow the country to channel its resources on rehabilitating quake-ravaged communities.

Her debt negotiators, led by Finance Secretary Jesus Estanislao, had said that a suggested unilateral moratorium would hamper the country's ability to get new foreign loans and restrict access to trade credits.

The government makes an automatic appropriation of some 40 percent of the budget—about P75 billion in 1992—for debt servicing.

Trade and Industry Secretary Jose Concepcion Jr. told reporters after the mass that the government supports Sin's call for a suspension of debt payments.

He, however, said that any suspension should be a "negotiated" accord with creditors and not a unilateral move by the government.

Aside from the government's foreign debt policy, Sin also criticized the "business as usual" attitude of businessmen and the rich who oppose measures to redistribute wealth.

"We cannot say we are for greater social justice if we are not willing to pursue substantial agrarian and urban land reform," he said. "We cannot say we support the common good if, in principle, we oppose all new progressive taxes.... We cannot say we are pro-people if we undermine their labor unions, their people's organizations, their desire to participate in this democracy that is as much theirs as it is yours and mine."

Editorial on Ineffectiveness of Land Reform

90SE0130C Manila *MANILA CHRONICLE* in English
23 Aug 90 p 4

[Editorial: "Land Reform: A Crumbling Cornerstone"]

[Text] When this Administration swept into power, one of the promises it made was land reform, effecting a change that had eluded every other previous government.

The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program was supposed to be a political cornerstone, a centerpiece demonstrating a commitment to dismantle one of the world's remaining feudal agricultural systems.

Four years later, the system is still feudal, and the commitment to change seems wan.

The years have seen more problems than progress, and Carp is fast becoming a tarnished centerpiece: been bedeviled by scandals, slow implementation, changes of leadership (four agrarian reform secretaries in three years), disputes about its implementation, and a trimming of its budget.

Only two days ago the government decided, once again, to deprive Carp of funds. It shelved a plan to ask donors to the Philippine Assistance Program [PAP] for Carp funds.

Instead, it was decided, the PAP meeting next month would be used to ask donors to fund the earthquake rehabilitation effort.

Government officials have said that the effect of switch in PAP funds—the figure of \$500 million has been mentioned—will be minimal, and that the earthquake rehabilitation is more important.

These arguments may be valid. The Department of Agrarian Reform is supposed to have difficulty processing the funds it has; and the earthquake certainly is an emergency that requires attention.

But the impression being given is that, from an urgent effort with political—even moral—overtones, Carp has become just another bureaucratic exercise, mired in bureaucratic bottlenecks. A program to be slashed, adjusted or toned down as exigency demands.

It almost seems that PAP was conveniently at hand when the government was searching for earthquake rehabilitation funds.

The behavior is ironic: first, because the government has spent a lot of effort building up PAP before donors as a means of attaining land reform. Second, because far from demonstrating a will to rebuild, the government is once again turning to its favorite—foreign funds.

And third, the PAP funds were not only meant to go to Carp. They were also supposed to go to pro-poor projects. Now they have been redirected to earthquake reconstruction.

But what is really being questioned here is the government's commitment to Carp. After having pressed for the sale of the Roppongi properties to raise money for Carp, the government is suddenly diverting money away from land reform.

The government's impetus in Carp seems fading. The progress—if that is the correct word—made by Carp has been informative.

The history of change shows it cannot be accomplished by words alone. And few programs can survive the gentle death guaranteed by neglect and bureaucratic strangulation.

Unless the government instills new vigor into Carp, what will be left of its centerpiece? Perhaps, the broken reputation of another administration which tried, and not too hard at that, but failed.

NPA Gets Arms, Ammunition From Unidentified Helicopters

90SE0131A Manila MANILA BULLETIN in English
18 Aug 90 p 10

[Text] San Jose, Mindoro Occidental—Top military officials confirmed here that unidentified helicopters have been supplying the New People's Army [NPA] with firearms and ammunition.

Brig. Gen. Evaristo G. Carino, Recom 4 PC-INP chief, helicoptered here with some of his staff officers and Lt. Col. Edgardo Aquino and Lt. Col. Necitas Katigbak, Mindoro Oriental and Cavite provincial commanders, respectively, to assess the operations against the NPA.

Lt. Col. Jundam H. Abdula Jr., Mindoro Occidental PC commander, briefed General Carino and his deputy, Col. Reynaldo Logan, concurrent "Task Force Mina de Oro" chief, after one month operation against insurgents and other lawless elements.

General Carino said that aside from the local command, one company from the Cavite PC command under Lt. Col. Necitas Katigbak and two platoons from Laguna and Rizal were assigned with Mindoro Oriental under Lt. Col. Edgardo Aquino. Mindoro Oriental has four companies aside from the CAFGUS.

In Mindoro Occidental, General Carino said elements of the Batangas PC and the Regional Special Action Force (RSAF) under Major Rosauro Magsino were operating

against the CPP-NPA. Carino said he will assign a platoon of PC from Marinduque and Romblon to augment the local command and will be under Lt. Col. Abdulah. All operating units in the two Mindoro provinces are under the supervision of Colonel Logan.

Colonel Abdulah told General Carino that two helicopters landed in barangay Morta here last July 17 and dropped firearms and ammunitions for the NPA. Lt. Antonio A. Victor, executive officer of the 2nd RSAF, told Carino that the late Capt. Antonio Alinarte organized four teams—one under him (Victor), another under Captain Alinarte, and one under T Sgt. Rajam Dawabi, and the 4th under Major Rosauro Nagsino.

Lt. Victor said that he positioned his team in barangay Morta at 9 p.m. of July 17, with Alinarte's team as blocking force. At about 12 midnight, two helicopters alighted, then took off. At 5:30 a.m., fighting started.

Captain Alinarte and one of his men, CIC Garcia, was killed while 14 rebels were killed. The fighting lasted five hour, Victor told Carino.

According to Lt. Victor the rebels fired thousand of bullets, while the troopers sometimes held their fire since they might run out of bullets. At 9:30 a.m., Colonel Abdulah arrived with ammunition and men and the NPA withdrew, bringing their dead companions.

Before returning back to Camp Vicente Lim, General Carino held a conference with all company commanders and told them to be vigilant after he received information that the NPA in Mindoro will attack military installations.

Carino also ordered Abdullah and Aquino to verify if the helicopters that delivered firearms and ammunition were commercial ones hired by the Communist Party of the Philippines in Manila.

Rebel Soldiers To Set Up Provisional Government

90SE0131B Manila MANILA CHRONICLE in English
24 Aug 90 p 1

[Text] Rebel soldiers said they would set up a provisional government in the mountains of Agusan del Sur, Mindanao, next week, preparatory to seizing Manila.

Senior officials in Camp Aguinaldo confirmed the rebels' plan, but said it had been "preempted" by a government attack on the mountain hideout of Alexander Noble, the renegade colonel.

"We knew it all along," said Philippine Constabulary Brig. Gen. Alfredo Filler, the armed forces deputy chief of staff for intelligence (J-2).

PC Brig. Gen. Emiliano Templo, AFP deputy chief of staff for civilian military operations, claimed the government forces' attack on the mountain lairs of dissident soldiers in Agusan had prevented the coup attempt.

However, the rebels said they would establish their government on or before Aug. 26, the anniversary of the 1896 revolution against Spain.

In a clandestine meeting with reporters outside Camp Aguinaldo, Carlos Maglalang, spokesman of the Young Officers Union (YOU), said the government would be composed of civilian and military leaders but gave no names.

He denied military reports that Noble and his Higaonon tribesman followers were on the run.

"We have completed the liberation of northern Mindanao and we will soon liberate central and western Mindanao," Maglalang said, quoting a report prepared by the Task Force Lapu-Lapu of the YOU Mindanao.

The report was sent to the YOU central committee in Manila, which opened a "media bureau" to disseminate news about the military's "Operation Highlander" in Agusan del Sur.

Maglalang claimed that two companies of Army Scout Rangers, composed of soldiers who participated in the coup last December, had linked up with Noble's forces in Esperanza town.

The Rangers were supposed to be led by Army Capt. Abraham Purugganan, Army Capt. Alberto Yen and Lt. Paterno Reynato Padua, all renegade soldiers.

Maglalang also claimed Noble had 10 companies under his command in Agusan. Two army battalions have reportedly left Cagayan de Oro and would join Noble's forces anytime this week.

Two marine battalions in Zamboanga were supposed to have expressed an intent to join the renegade forces, while communist and separatists agreed to a truce and promised to support the dissident soldiers.

"We are mobilizing all our YOU cells in Mindanao to join Noble and his army in Agusan," Maglalang said.

Maglalang also claimed that the marine battalion assigned to assault Noble's lair had already pulled out and refused to carry out its assignment.

But Filler said government forces were confident that all field commanders in Mindanao remained loyal to the chain-of-command.

He said the rebel propaganda was aimed at demoralizing soldiers and confusing the people. "It's quite obvious, they wanted to picture the government helpless in controlling rampant bombings and other terrorist acts in the capital," a Camp Aguinaldo spokesman said.

Reports of massing of rebel forces in Mindanao swept military camps despite denials by senior defense and military officials about any "big plans by the rebels."

Paper Faults Decision on U.S. Use of Bases

90SE0136B Bangkok *DAILY NEWS* in Thai
30 Aug 90 p 5

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Thailand's attitude toward the crisis in the Persian Gulf is quite proper. Even though we have to act in accord with the UN resolution, there is no need for us to jump into this or take a clear position by acting like an enemy of Iraq. It should not be forgotten that there are still a large number of Thai workers in Iraq. And in the future, even if we can get our workers out of that country, there is no need for us to announce that we are an enemy of Iraq.

In the case of the United States, there have been many times when the United States has not treated us like a real friend. Rather, the United States wants us to follow along behind it. Whenever we refuse to obey or follow their lead, we always get hurt.

We should not focus on small benefits. We should not think that allowing them to use military bases on a temporary basis is an expression of friendship or that this is a small matter and that we can ask them to leave any time. Because if we allow them to use bases, it will be very difficult to get them to leave. We have already had an excellent example of that. Let's not do anything that will invite an enemy into the house.

Traders: Deals With Iraq, Kuwait Still Possible

90SE0134A Bangkok *THE NATION* in English
11 Aug 90 p 13

[Text] Thai exporters say they will consider trading with Iraq and Kuwait through Dubai and the United Arab Emirates if permitted by the government which has directed a committee to seek ways of complying with trade sanctions implemented by the United Nations.

While the Thai government has not yet imposed economic sanctions on Iraq, official contacts with the Gulf contacts have been banned. At present, only private sector contacts are permitted.

The Foreign Affairs Ministry, meanwhile, has formed a special committee to weigh the pros and cons of imposing economic sanctions on Iraq after the United Nations resolved earlier this week to punish Iraq through sanctions and requested member countries, including Thailand, to follow suit.

In the meantime, exporters are closely monitoring developments in the Gulf following the Iraqi invasion. They say they are waiting for clearer signals from the government on its position in regard to commercial relations with the two Gulf countries before resuming trade.

Thailand's trade with Iraq and Kuwait was automatically suspended after the August 2 incursion. Since then, trade contacts have been severed amid extreme economic uncertainty. However, private exporters have said they hope to resume trade links soon.

In other developments, the Bangkok Bank said in an official statement released yesterday that it would relax the terms of payment for those private companies which have been affected by the suspension of the country's trade ties with Iraq and Kuwait.

And, major oil refiner Bangchak Petroleum Co issued an official statement dismissing reports that Middle East crude oil supplies had been disrupted.

But, Chalaw Fueng-arom, director-general of the Department of Export Promotion, admitted that Thailand's economic relations with the two Middle Eastern countries had been damaged by the skirmish and that exporters were uncertain about their future relations with the two countries.

They feared the fighting would drag on and that the Persian Gulf would be closed to traffic. In the meantime, they would find ways to minimize risks in the event that the economic embargo on Iraq is implemented in line with the call by the UN Security Council.

Until recently, trade with Kuwait was channelled through Dubai, a port city along the Gulf, but the overall volume has been relatively small, averaging about Bt8 billion a year.

Kuwait imports garments, canned food and leather among other Thai products while Iraq is one of the Middle East's largest rice importers.

Exporters are waiting for the government to clarify its position in regard to the economic sanction, Chalaw said.

Trade with Iraq is mainly conducted under long-term contracts. Although some local rice exporters still have contracts to supply rice to Iraq, they are extremely reluctant they have put delivery on hold due to concern over how and when the payments would be made. Bilateral trade with Iraq averages between Bt5-Bt6 billion a year.

Chalaw said exporters could be forced to change routes. Some exporters have stated that if the fighting continues, the United Arab Emirates and Dubai would become important transit points for trade with the Gulf.

The director-general, meanwhile, remained optimistic that the conflict would not affect a trade fair the department planned to hold in Iraq in October. According to sources, Iraq will likely cancel the fair due to fears that major exhibitors will boycott it anyway.

Worapong Pitchapongsa, managing director of Capital Rice Co, one of the country's top three rice exporters, warned that the costs of imposing economic sanctions and banning rice exports to Iraq could be high.

He urged the government to take into account the national interest when making its decision, Iraq still owes about Bt2 billion to Thai rice exporters for grain

already delivered. Worapong expressed confidence that Iraq would abide by its commitment because Thailand is the largest rice supplier.

Observers say that if the fighting continues, demand for rice will increase significantly, enabling Thailand and other rice exporting countries to sell more rice.

A company spokesman said that the commodity export Soon Hua Seng Group, the country's largest rice exporter, has been monitoring developments in the Middle East and was certain that the Thai government would abide by the UN Security Council resolution calling for economic sanctions.

The company is prepared to comply with government policy despite the fact that it holds several rice orders.

In reference to the U.S. decision not to ban the flow of food and medicine into Iraq, the spokesman said that private companies would be permitted to make direct contact with the Iraqi government to supply the two necessities.

The export ban would not affect the group's performance because it would still supply the grain to other importers. With parts of China and Brazil reportedly suffering from droughts demand for Thai rice is expected to remain strong.

During the past two years, a group comprising seven rice traders including Chaiyaporn Rice, Seng Thong Trading, Capital Rice, Huay Chuan Trading, Hong Aia Seng Trading, Siam rice and Soon Hua Seng has been the major supplier of rice to Iraq. This year, it received orders totalling 90,000 tonnes.

Damrong Kirsanamara, managing director of the Bangkok Bank, said that the fighting in the Gulf will have only a mild impact on Thailand. He, however, expressed concern for the safety of thousands of Thai workers there.

In an official statement released yesterday, the banker said that the Bangkok Bank was seeking ways to relax the terms of payment for clients who have commercial contacts with the two Middle Eastern countries and are affected by trade suspension.

A total of about Bt10 million in credit has been extended to traders dealing with the two countries.

Cash transfers between Kuwait, Iraq and Thailand would become more difficult, he said, because the U.S. has asked its own financial institutions to freeze Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets, crippling the financial capabilities of the two countries.

On Thursday, Damrong said the National Bank of Kuwait told him that the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank might relax its freeze on assets. But the report has yet to be confirmed.

NSC Opposes SRV, State of Cambodia Friendship Groups

90SE0136A Bangkok *KHAO PHISET* in Thai
13-19 Aug 90 p 11

[“Intelligence” column]

[Text] The pressure applied by a certain group of politicians has failed to achieve results. At last month's NSC [National Security Council] meeting, the NSC decided that this is not the right time to establish either a Thai-Cambodia Friendship Association or a Thai-Vietnamese Friendship Association. No one is particularly fond of that first association, because that does not seem feasible. As for the second association, there don't seem to be any problems. But the representatives of some units who attended the meeting that day seemed surprised. Even Mr. Chachatphai Burutphat, the deputy secretary general of the NSC, seemed to be very doubtful. The army's representative at the meeting said that the regimes in Phnom Penh and Vietnam still pose a threat to Thailand's security. No one knows whether General Chatchai Chunhawan, who presided at the meeting, had any doubts. But the prime minister listened quietly to the statements made by the army representative.

Electricity Authority Governor on Privatization

90SE0134B Bangkok *THE NATION* in English
16 Aug 90 P 19

[Article by Pichaya Changsorn: “EGAT Favours Privatization”]

[Text] The Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand [EGAT] has officially acknowledged for the first time that privatization of power supplies is possible with the private sector being allowed to become partners in power production.

Phaophat Chavanalikhikorn, the EGAT governor, said the build-own-service strategy represents the best short-term solution to the process of privatizing the agency, which would help to resolve the shortfall of funds available for investment in a new power plants to serve the growing electricity demand.

There is no legal conflict foreseen if private investors are to join the power agency in investing in power generation operations through the build-own-service strategy, under which the agency will be responsible for management, power distribution and securing logistics for the overall power production process, while the private investors will be limited to making financial investment only.

The build-own-service strategy has sailed through the EGAT's board of directors, but will have to be screened by the National Economic and Social Development Board, and receive final approval from the National Energy Policy Committee under the chairmanship of the prime minister.

Phaophat said this strategy might be applied with the expansion of the lignite-driven power plants at Mae Moh, Lampang Province, and the coal-driven power plants at Ao Phai.

He added that in the long term, provided that the economic conditions are stable, EGAT will be floating some of its power projects on the Securities Exchange of Thailand.

"Listing some of the power projects is a good method for the agency to raise funds and by that time it will not be opposed by the labour union of EGAT," he said.

He believed that floating investment in the EGAT's power projects will take place during the 7th National Economic and Social Development Plan.

Meanwhile, Phaophat said over the next three years demand for electricity will grow at a rate of about 11 per cent a year, and that by 1993 EGAT will be able to increase its electricity generation capacity by another 3,500 megawatts to 11,000 megawatts, while actual demand will stand at about 11,000mw. Current demand for electricity is about 7,056mw.

He also detailed Egat's consumption of natural gas as fuel to drive its power plants, which are burning 440 million cubic feet per day which is barely enough to meet actual demand.

EGAT is operating several power plants designed to be fuelled by both natural gas and other liquid fuels. Inadequate supplies of natural gas have forced EGAT to rely more on liquid fuels, which are more expensive and cause more harm to the environment.

This is likely to cost EGAT more in power generation because oil prices are more expensive than the price of the domestically-supplied natural gas. And with the government's insistence that electricity bills will not be raised, EGAT will stand to suffer heavier burdens.

Phaophat said the ratio of EGAT's consumption of natural gas in the future will gradually decline, after having fallen from 57 per cent in 1987 to 53 per cent in 1988, to 50 per cent in 1989 and to 40 per cent this year, while the agency's reliance on oil will correspondingly increase over the next six years.

Arms Trader's Background, Associates Discussed

90WC0108A Bangkok KHAO PHISET in Thai
9-15 Jul 90 pp 27-34

[Excerpts] Looking back to 1983, Dr. Chaiyut Kannasut of Ital Thai Marine Ltd., a friend of former prime minister General Prem Tinsulanon, was aghast when he learned that Rasi Bualoet, an unknown women the age of his children, had become a leading arms dealer by submitting the winning bid to build a ship named "Surin" for the navy. That contract was worth 400 million baht. That was the first step on the ladder that helped her rise to the top. After that, she was involved in

the sale of four frigates worth 15 billion baht to the navy. There have also been reports that at least 60 million baht in cash for the purchase of a helicopter carrier and royal helicopters for the navy and air force will end up at a large mansion in the Wiphawadi-Rangsit area. This mansion is the former house of the daughter of a senior military officer and is now the headquarters of the Charoenloet Enterprises Company Ltd., an arms trading company. Finally, there have been reports that godfathers such as Naowarat Phattanodom have been bested by younger dealers such as Rasi Bualoet.

Leading Women in Weapons Circles

Around the end of 1987 and the beginning of 1988, three women became well known as arms dealers. One was Sirikanya Sunthorasima of Keng Kanya Enterprises, a partner of Edward Liu of the Sems Singapore Company, who organized the "Defense 87-88" arms show and who, in response to charges that women were being used to sell weapons, boldly said that this was just a stratagem used to promote sales. Another woman is Phanni Kanokchot, a senior official at Deutsch Bank, who received a secret telephone message from a woman telling her to decorate the body in the form of a man. And there is Rasi Bualoet, the chairman of the board of Charoenloet Enterprises Ltd., who has frankly admitted that "people have complained to senior people about my terrible behavior."

The fact that the roles of these three women have been portrayed in a negative way indicates that there is a conflict between two major arms dealers. One of these is a customer of Deutsch Bank, or the Bank of Germany, with whom Phanni has relations in her capacity as a bank official. But Rasi Bualoet is the only one who has resisted and gone against the tide to the point where one of her male competitors has said that "if the military power pole stays in this position, most of the new budget funds will go to Rasi. Others will get very little."

Sirikanya has left her position as an advisor and partner to Edward Liu and become involved in mass communications activities with her son-in-law, Dr. Pratchayathawi Tawethikun. She is also involved in land activities involving the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Phani Knokchot is still responsible for deposit accounts and the revolving funds of major customers, whose accounts reach 100 million baht, at the Deutsch Bank on Sathon Road.

Along with keeping in step with military "Bigs" at major social events and abroad, Rasi has also scored major achievements in her business activities. During the past 2-4 years, she has been so successful that men in the same circle have had to admit that they been defeated. Because today, arms deals are under the influence of Rasi Bualoet, who is prepared in terms of both manpower and capabilities.

Even senior military officers who have had contact with her have had to admit that she has achieved more than anyone expected. Viewed from a psychological standpoint, this "may be because she was once very poor.

Thus, she has been willing to take risks, unlike others who are comfortable in their lives." At the same time, Rasi has said that "I decide to go ahead with something when I think that there is at least a 70 percent chance of succeeding. If I don't think that there is a good chance of succeeding, I don't become involved. This is why it seems that I have been so successful."

Even though there have been reports that her Charoenloet Enterprises Company has won four major contracts worth millions from the navy and air force in just the past few years, Rasi still maintains that the only "real" contract was the Surin worth 400 million. This ship has now been turned over to the navy.

New Route From Ratburi to Don Muang

Rasi has said that she became involved in these activities around 1977 during the time that General Lik Naeomali was minister of defense. Her friends remember that she did a good business selling goods to the army Engineer Department at Ratburi. It's said that her first supporter before she became a major player was a former chief of the Engineer Department, with whom she had a close personal relationship.

Records of that period are in accord with statements that she made at the beginning of 1981. She said that the first items that she sold were binoculars for night use. Later on, she sold other items, most of which were small items for the army.

Rasi continued to sell things to the Engineer Department at Ratburi until her "supporter" retired. He continued to help her, but things were not as convenient as before. "Things were not going well for her and so she took the money she had earned in Ratburi and set up shop in Bangkok."

No one knows where a provincial trader like Rasi got the courage to start playing on the "big field" in Bangkok. It may have been because a new "financier" with the rank of army colonel, who owned three large massage parlors on Si Ayuthaya Road and at the end of the Phra Pin Klaow bridge, served as her business foundation. But it is well known that this colonel gave her much financial support. Because of this support, Rasi was able to carry on activities by herself through the Charoenloet Enterprises Company Ltd, which had registered capital of 30 million baht. She later formed the Ying Ruai Estate Company and the Challenge Industries Company, which are involved in land activities and medical equipment. There are several shareholders, including generals and lieutenant generals.

However, becoming a businesswoman in Bangkok by relying on the help of a new financier with businesses in the Si Ayuthaya area after giving up her secure base with the Engineer Department at Ratburi did not lead to the success that she had dreamed of. Challenging the older businessmen who had contracts with the top weapons companies and who had good relations with the power elite in the military was not easy.

While pulling away from the army on the urging of Amphon Kritibut, a close friend who now holds the position of managing director of the Ying Ruai Estate and Challenge Industries companies, in 1983 Rasi had the opportunity of attending the funeral of the eldest daughter of Lieutenant General Chawalit Yongchaiyut, the [then] deputy army chief of staff. She had been killed in an accident. That same year, Rasi received a contract to serve as the representative of the Korea Thama Company. She was like "Jack the giant killer," beating Dr Chaiyut in the bid to build the Surin for the navy during the period when Admiral Sombun Chuaphibun was RTN CINC [Royal Thai Navy Commander-in-Chief]. During that same period, her relations with Phankhrua Yongchaiyut, the wife of General Chawalit, grew much closer. On many occasions, when Phankhrua appeared at a social function, Rasi and Amphon were by her side. There were many times when the three of them traveled abroad together. Some of the "jet setters" in Rasi's group accompanied them on occasion.

Thus, it seemed as if the golden age of Rasi had arrived. In 1988, the navy, headed by Admiral Praphat Krutsanachan, ordered four frigates from China valued at 15 billion baht. This was followed by an order for two helicopter carriers at a cost of 5 billion and then a 600-million baht order for a helicopter to be used as a royal conveyance. This helicopter was purchased by the air force under the command of Air Chief Marshal Kaset Rotchananin. These items were all purchased through Rasi Bualoet, the new shadow of Phankhrua. In this, she pushed aside Wimon Phattanodom, the wife of Naowarat Phattanodom, who had been a close associate and favorite of Phankhrua ever since her husband had been the chief of the Directorate of Operations. That is why there is so much animosity between "older" people such as Naowarat Phattanodom and Rasi Bualoet, a junior merchant. There is the same "stiffness" between them as there is between Rasi and Dr. Chaiyut whenever they meet.

However, even though she succeeded in pushing aside Wimon Phattanodom, the wife of Naowarat Phattanodom, to the point where Phankhrua [Chawalit] hardly paid any attention to her, that doesn't mean that Rasi was successful in besting Naowarat on this front. Thus, Charoenloet Enterprises had to change course and focus on the navy.

The reason for Rasi's success with the navy was the conflict between Admiral Praphat Krutsanachan, the RTN CINC, and Naowarat Phattanodom. The conflict between these men went back to the time when Admiral Sangat Chaloyu was the RTN CINC, and there was an ensign named Praphat Krutsanachan. "Mr Naowarat never thought much of Praphat. At that time, Praphat was a junior officer," said a news source in arms circles about this. Thus, after Admiral Praphat became RTN CINC, it was difficult for the Commercial Associates Company of Mr. Naowarat to break down the barriers.

At the same time, even though Admiral Praphat rose to power with the "overturn" of General Prem Tinsulanon, the prime minister, because he has been able to "adjust himself" to the environment, he has managed to retain his position during subsequent reshuffles. "His social skills and his ability to coordinate things with the RTA CINC and, in particular, the chief of staff officers, General Sunthon Khongsomphong, will probably enable Admiral Praphat to retain his top spot in the navy," said a news source close to senior military officers.

These internal and external conditions of Admiral Praphat represent a victory on the naval front for Rasi Bualoet. Even though there have been rumors about "pressures" to pave the way to the goal, no one can deny that the 1988 sale of the four Chinese frigates to the Thai navy completely changed the position of Rasi Bualoet and increased her bargaining power on trade issues. That gave rise to rumors that she grabbed the sales contracts for the helicopter carrier from the navy and the royal helicopters from the air force.

Dream or Reality?

Rasi Bualoet once told KHAO PHISET that the only thing that she had actually sold was the Surin. She was noncommittal about the Chinese frigates, and her personal secretary strongly denied any involvement in the two most recent deals. However, people in military circles and some arms dealers are sure that Rasi was involved in this.

However, in the case of two helicopter carriers valued at 5 billion, which does not include the two squadrons of helicopters (50 helicopters) worth 10 billion baht, an observer has told KHAO PHISET the facts about this. He said that the navy has not yet made a decision about this. They are still considering whether to buy from an Italian or German company. As for the "Dun Sen" ship, for which Rasi is thought to be the agent, "this has not yet been built and there are no models for people to see."

The same is true in the case of the EH-101 helicopter of the EH Industries Company, a joint Italian-English company. This, too, is a commercial aircraft that has not yet gone into commercial production. It is still being tested and has not been approved by the Flying Institute of England. But according to a report on the January 1990 meeting of the Subcommittee To Select a Royal Helicopter, which is headed by Air Vice Marshal Thawon Loetsin, a decision has been made to purchase this helicopter as a royal conveyance.

The same observer said that it will be at least 5 more years before the EH-101 helicopter goes into production. Moreover, the EH Industries Company has a legal agent in Thailand whose contract has not yet expired. "Rasi has cut in, but if she sells these helicopters, the old agent will take action." That is, the agent will sue for damages and the commission owed the lawful agent.

The Woman Who Controls the World, the Hidden Power of the Jet Set

After the change in leadership in the military, people began keeping an eye on the soldiers in front of Rasi. Some people wondered who would become her protector now. She had had a close relationship with Phankhrua Yongchaiyut, which was clear for all to see, and so people wondered whether that would now hinder her business activities. Some people began to take hope with respect to major programs of the navy and air force. But inside news sources have said that this "iron lady" in arms circles does not seem to be concerned at all. This is because members of her jet set, which includes Amphon Kritibut, Farida Bunyasak, Siya Siwayu, Chaithip Yuwabun, still have close relations with senior military leaders.

A news source told KHAO PHISET that at a party held at a hotel not too long ago, "I saw three top military leaders sitting together. Out of curiosity, I asked about this and was told that this was a birthday party for one of the people there. And as everyone knows, if three senior military leaders attend someone's birthday party, it shows that that person must have great influence." And it is known that on 20 October 1989, Air Chief Marshal Kaset Rotchananin issued an order repealing the 20 October 1988 order to appoint a committee to select a helicopter to serve as a royal conveyance. He appointed a new committee and repealed the motion to use the American-made Black Hawk helicopter as a royal conveyance and replace it with the Bell 412 SP, for which Naowarat Phattanodom is the agent, and the EH-101 of the EH Industries Company. That was at the urging of Rasi Bualoet, who exerted pressure through some commander.

Actually, neither of these two helicopters had been considered by the first committee. That was particularly true of the EH-101 helicopter, which has not yet gone into production. The helicopter selection subcommittee informed Air Chief Marshal Anan Klintha, the air force chief of staff and the chairman of the selection committee, that this was a high-performance helicopter that uses modern technology. Thus, it would be safer and more convenient than other models. But this helicopter is still under development and will not go into production for another 3-4 years. It was their opinion that this model would be very safe and thus very suitable as a royal conveyance.

Reports from some people in the air force said that the subcommittee made its decision based on papers submitted to it. It did not see the real thing. The person who suggested that the committee consider a helicopter that is still in the test stage and that has not yet gone into production was Group Cpt Samanmit Ruchakhom, the then deputy chief of staff of the Directorate of Aeronautical Engineering.

Even though Air Chief Marshal Kaset Rotchananin announced on 16 May 1990 that the air force would purchase only 412-SP helicopters to serve as a royal

conveyance, he did not give any further details about this flight of five helicopters that serve as royal conveyances. And when the two original Bell 214 helicopters wear out, he did not say with what types they will be replaced.

The close relationship between the jet set group of Rasi and certain leaders of CRMA [Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy] classes 1 and 5 is no guarantee of the continued growth of the Charoenloet Enterprise Company, which is trying to push aside the Commercial Associates Company, which wields influence in the army. But this is an indication of their growing influence in the air force, the Bureau of the Budget, and the Office of the Prime Minister. "Otherwise, the Bureau of the Budget would not have forgotten to include funds for this in the 1990 draft budget act. This matter was again raised just 20 days after Air Chief Marshal Kaset became RTAF CINC [Royal Thai Air Force Commander-in-Chief] even though this is an important issue and the air force had made a decision on which model to purchase in March 1989, when Air Chief Marshal Woranat Aphichari was still the RTAF CINC," said a military news source.

Some people have predicted that Rasi's bold actions, together with the fact that a retired vice admiral is a major shareholder and the person who formulates the plans and coordinates foreign activities and the fact that the jet setters engage in "heart-to-heart" activities, will result in her becoming the chief arms dealer in place of Naowarat Phattanodom within the next year. The constantly changing military and political power holders may be the ones who determine this, but only in part. The person who will actually determine this will be Rasi Bualoet. [passage omitted]

Members of the Board of the Challenge Industries Company per Letter of Guarantee of 9 October 1989

1. Admiral Prathuang Wongchan 2. Vice Admiral Anan Chanharakun 3. Miss Rasi Bualoet 4. Mrs. Amphon Kritibut 5. Miss Uma Loetrutthirabin

Registered capital: 14.5 million baht

Shareholders in the Charoenloet Enterprises Company per Letter of Guarantee of 9 December 1984

1. Colonel Sawat Phatchunchai: 101,000 shares 2. Admiral Prathuang Wongchan: 31,000 shares 3. Vice Admiral Anan Chanharakun: 31,000 shares 4. Miss Rasi Bualoet: 101,000 shares 5. Mr., Surachai Bualoet: 30,900 shares 6. Miss Phimonman Phichitkhadiphon: 5,000 shares 7. Miss Sunisa Suhachai: 100 shares

Registered capital: 30 million baht

[Interview]

[Question] In the view of other arms dealers, what is Rasi like?

[Answer] Rasi is a major organizer. Her business grew from her activities with engineers in Ratburi. She

worked in that circle for 12-13 years. She has frequently changed financiers and companies. Most recently, she found a financier in Bangkok, that is, the owner of the Chao Phraya Massage Parlor, and began selling weapons. But then she split away and formed her own company. There are now four or five people in her jet set, and each of those people has her own profession. These people bring in sales for Rasi.

In the view of other arms dealers, Rasi's success can be attributed to these jet setters. I can't go into their selling practices. But their methods are definitely different from ours. As for whether she will overtake Mr. Naowarat, my guess is that she will do so within the next year. Look at how she operates. As long as the military situation remains like it is today, Rasi will get the major share of the new budget. Others will get very little.

However, one disadvantage of hers is that she became involved in this later than others. It's virtually impossible for her to take control of goods or agents. That's because the Locks Lay Group of Chatthani Chatikawanit, Ital-Thai of Chaiyut Kannasut, Commercial Associates of Naowarat Phattanodom, Cybernetics of Amnuai Kasemsap, and so on control all the old items. It's not easy to take away agents from others. She will have to find poorer-quality goods and rely on sales techniques. That is the same thing that Naowarat did, and he was successful. Selling poorer-quality items has enabled them to bargain for a higher commission. If it's a well-known item that is sold worldwide, you can't bargain about the commission rate. They already have a rate that they will offer you, and they pay the same rate everywhere in the world. Even if you try and explain that costs are higher in Thailand, they won't give you a higher rate. Thus, both Naowarat and Rasi have used the same style. That is, they have dealt in poorer-quality goods, from which they can earn a higher commission.

It must be admitted that Rasi is now "coming on" strong. Her jet set group of four-five people is giving off shoots. These are all prominent widows ages 40-45. They are smart people who have a great opportunity in commercial circles. We can't beat them. We try and make sales in the offices of commanders. But these people don't do that. We don't stand a chance against them if our goods are all of the same quality.

It must be admitted that we are now close to senior people. They look upon us with favor. They know that our goods are of good quality and have given us some business. That's fine. But they shouldn't buy everything from the same person, because the goods of one person can't all be good. Rasi now wields influence. She is prepared in terms of manpower and leadership.

[Question] Would you tell us more about the items sold by Rasi?

[Answer] There is a frigate worth 4 billion. But it still needs much more work done on it. There are the two German helicopter carriers. People are watching to see if this will exceed the budget. It will be very costly. But I

think that there will be funds, because they entertain each other frequently. Sometimes they go to Europe. They go there in great numbers. People in our circle all know about this. About four or five people go from each unit. They go to Europe for 4-5 days or even a week.

[Question] Which units?

[Answer] Every unit concerned.

[Question] You mean the military, Office of the Prime Minister, and the Bureau of the Budget, right?

[Answer] Look at the senior leaders in the military and see which ones are the same age as government officials in the Office of the Prime Minister and the Bureau of the Budget. Take a look at who the senior people are in these units. They are the same age as the commanders of the military services. They can understand each other.

[Question] Who supports Rasi?

[Answer] Her friends have become close to people.

[Question] It's known that a major supporter is a former assistant accountant for the navy.

[Answer] That has no effect on business activities. Because once the board of directors has been appointed, even a former general can't help. They don't pay any attention to such senior people. They say hello very politely, but if they ask for a job...there isn't any. They feel that "when you were in power, you made the purchases. I was just a junior officer and did not interfere. Now that I am No. 1, you shouldn't interfere." That's the way it is. Thus, there aren't any former senior military officers who are supporting Rasi. She has done things using her own talents. But by doing things the way she is, she will remain on top for only a short time. And once things reach the saturation point, she won't be accepted either here or abroad.

[Question] This shows that you aren't really concerned about the present situation, because those who rise to the top will eventually fall again.

[Answer] There is a constant turnover in arms circles. Some people remain on top for just a short time. Only if they are really clever can they remain on top for a long time. At lower levels, those who can't make it have to turn to some other business. Things fluctuate like this. And what is strange about this business is that those in this business have to rely on their closeness to military officers and bankers. They have to spend billions. They can't make a sale without the support of senior people. They have to associate with them.

[Question] If women really make an effort, the idea that this is men's work will probably fade away.

[Answer] If they form groups like this, it will be very difficult for men to compete. I once thought about competing by hiring some pretty girls ages 18-25 to work as salespersons. But that didn't work. The girls were

pretty. Fine. These girls were prettier than the women in the jet set. But the jet set had other attributes. The senior people didn't have to worry. They had to protect their positions in society. They couldn't let personal matters affect their positions. But by using pretty girls, the senior people could have compromised their positions, because the girls might have said something. Thus, there is only one way to compete with them and that is to form another jet set. But as everyone knows, the members of this jet set have money. It would be difficult to form another jet set. That is not easy to do.

In Rasi's circle, it's known that she is the leader. She refers to herself as "Tom." She controls the others in her group.

[Question] How much compensation is earned from the weapons companies? How much is paid for each item?

[Answer] In the United States, if the item meets the standards of the U.S. military, the commission is five percent. But if the item is not in the storehouses of the U.S. military, the commission paid the agent may range from eight to 12 percent. In Europe and England, the rate is eight to 18 percent. I think about 12 percent. These commissions don't include the cost of pulling strings, which we have to do. We have to pay this ourselves. The factories won't. But some companies, such as Cadillac, have a minimum of eight percent. But if there are many competitors and costs are high, you can ask for 12 percent. Besides this, if you make the sale, you can ask for special costs of \$50,000. Mr. Naowarat sold the V-150 vehicle, which is an armored vehicle used by our army and police. That was 10 years ago. Think about how much each vehicle cost. If 200 were purchased and \$50,000 was added on for each one, think how much money was involved. And then there was the commission. Thus, people in this business calculate how much they should make from each company and each country. We estimate correctly, and so do they. We can estimate the strength of our competitors. Thus, people have different styles.

In England and Europe, the rates are about the same. But in the United States, things are more orderly. Rates are low, because in the United States there is an anti-corruption group. Every time that items are sold to a country, the factory must send the contract to the congressional military subcommittee. They will look at the breakdown of the costs. If they find that money has been paid under the table, the board of that factory will be questioned about unnecessary costs. This includes entertaining officials who come to observe activities. If the expenses total a million dollars, they will check to see how that million was spent. If things are unclear, people will be called in for questioning. This isn't done in Europe.

Another thing is that in the United States, if it is a piece of equipment that is used by their military, regardless of whether it is a ship, an airplane, a helicopter, gun, or tank, they will set a base price. Every item that the U.S.

military buys, the military will provide financial support to build a plant for that item. It's as if the government hires the private sector to build these. Thus, they have the right to examine things and to stop sales. For example, suppose that we want to purchase F-18 aircraft, which is now America's best fighter aircraft. After we send a letter to the U.S. air force, the air force will submit the matter to the Pentagon. They will look at various factors and decide whether to sell the item. If they agree to sell the item, they will submit the letter to Congress and declare the intention of the Department of Defense to sell F-16 aircraft to Thailand. The matter takes about 60 days. If congressmen don't agree, they can oppose this. If the opposition wins, they can stop the sale. But if no one objects within 60 days, they will read this announcement in Congress. Unless someone objects, the sale can go forward.

What the United States is afraid of is that modern weapons used by the U.S. military will fall into the hands of the enemy. If they sell items to Thailand and Thailand suffers losses on the battlefields of neighboring countries, the parts could be sent to the Soviet Union. The United States isn't as concerned about this region as it is about Europe. Thus, the United States is uneasy. If their technology falls into the enemy's hands, the game could change. In Europe, their aircraft could be shot down. That is what they are concerned about. But the United States has to sell equipment to Thailand, because Thailand is their last friend in Southeast Asia, even though the U.S. military has never viewed Thailand as being prepared as far as military equipment is concerned. Because whatever we want to buy, we buy. There are no standards. Even though there are plans about the size of our combat forces, our purchasing system is a mess. It all depends on whom we want to purchase goods from. Our purchases are not orderly.

[Question] What types of weapons does the Thai military want now?

[Answer] The most important items today are aircraft. There is a great need for aircraft, because in modern warfare, aircraft can do everything. Aircraft can protect our country. They can strike other countries and protect us. Second is preventing them from attacking us. That is, establishing air defenses by setting up radar centers, having reconnaissance aircraft, and having ground-to-air missiles. Third is internal defense, which is the duty of the army. But if we launch an offensive, that is, if we attack by air and sea, the army will be the final support. Those are the needs of the military.

Thus, the air force will soon submit its 5-year program on building new combat units in order to increase efficiency. Or there may be a 15-year plan. That is, the present commander will purchase everything, making it unnecessary to purchase anything for 15 years. As for whether there will be enough money for this, no one knows. We may pay on installment for 10 years. At the same time, the navy and the army will do the same thing.

Commanders in office for two years have made purchases for 15 years. Thus, those who replace them will have a chance to do only one thing and that is pay off the old debts. They won't have a chance to buy anything.

Rasi Bualoet

I am a worrier, but I like to tackle difficult and challenging tasks. If I lose, I lose. But if I win, it means that I have succeeded.

Ten years ago, I lost my job and was unemployed. I happened to know a woman in arms trading circles. I had a chance to accompany her on a business trip to the Ministry of Defense. I waited for her outside. The head of a directorate came and inquired about purchasing a piece of equipment for the military. We chatted, and I learned the specifications of the item that he wanted. I wanted to try my hand at this business and so I told him that I had what he was looking for even though I didn't. But in the end, I was able to sell that item.

The first items that I sold to the military were binoculars for use at night. After that, I sold other items, most of which were small pieces of equipment for the army. After engaging in that for four to five years, I became bored. I stopped selling things to the army. By chance, in 1983 I won a naval shipbuilding contract in the name of the Korea Thama Company from Korea.

When I went to negotiate, they were not pleased. Right after I arrived for the negotiations, they asked me with whom I had links. They wanted to know to which senior officials I had ties. But I didn't know anyone. They weren't very happy. But fortunately, I won the bid.

If I do not win a bid, I do not become emotional. Instead, I go and question the people in control because I want to learn. I want to know what happened so that I can use that as a lesson the next time. This is the trick that I use in my work. I make a decision on any given job only if I think that the chances of succeeding are 70 percent or better. If I don't think that there is a good chance of succeeding, I don't become involved. That is why it seems that I always have work.

Actually, I am not the only woman in this line of work. There are two or three others. I don't know why they aren't in the news. The fact that we are women doesn't give us an advantage. Actually, being a woman is a great obstacle in this profession. Being a woman prevents me from accompanying customers to places where men would go or from meeting customers on a one-to-one basis to discuss business. This is the disadvantage of being a woman in this profession. Some people have said that I engage in other things besides selling arms. They have said that I give myself, too, and that I am the concubine of department heads. I don't know what to do. Thus, I have responded by saying that in each department in the military, there are many generals. Pick one of them and arrange for him to have lunch with me.

THAILAND

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Then watch and see what my attitude is. That should prove my case. And is it wrong that I happen to have friends who are attractive?

I had a chance to meet Phankhrua Yongchaiyut at the funeral of the eldest daughter of General Chawalit, who was then the deputy army chief of staff. A friend who knew her took me to the funeral. After that, I met her on several other occasions. Phankhrua is a very warm and generous person. She makes everyone around her feel

comfortable. As a result, some people who really don't know her very well tell others that they are close to her.

I don't know all the facts. But two months ago, someone sent an anonymous letter to a senior official complaining about the terrible methods that I had used to contact a government unit.

(From the 3-9 February 1988 issue of KHAO PHISET)

POLITICAL

Discussion of Political Renovation Focuses on Party's Action

902E0269A *Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG*
in Vietnamese 4 Aug 90 p 2

[Article by Le Tinh: "Some Thoughts About Our Current Political Renovation"]

[Text] The crisis bearing the nature of social disturbances in the European socialist countries is having negative effects on our country. This is an appropriate area that gives rise to rightist and leftist opportunistic perceptions and views. Particularly rightist opportunistic thoughts. This also is an opportunity for imperialist and reactionary forces inside and outside of the country, which have been nurturing hope for retaliation, to take action.

This is the time, more than any other time before, that the masses and a large number of party members have been waiting for as they wish that the party would assert its solid position, hope that it would renovate itself so as to acquire more strength, and earnestly want it to consolidate and perfect itself in order to lead the country toward overcoming the difficulties that lie ahead and achieving a good life under socialism, the eternal dream of so many generations.

Realities have pointed out that nobody else but the CPV [Communist Party of Vietnam] has initiated, led the way, and led the renovating effort. That renovation was conceived by our party at its 6th Congress in 1986. Since then our party has been the organizer and executor of each and every renovation position and policy, and has turned the people's earnest hope for renovation into lively reality. With priority given to economic renovation and the maintaining of political stability, we are gradually broadening democracy within the party, in mass organizations, and in society as a whole. The recent elections that selected deputies to the People's Councils at all levels was a great step on the road to democratization. We have truly broadened democracy and renovated the activities of the National Assembly as the highest organ representing the people's right of ownership. Our party has also raised early enough a question of current interest as a political task: to determine the functions of the party and the state and to separate the administrative function and economic function of the ruling machinery. We are gradually resolving this question in conformity to the characteristics of our country and in accordance with appropriate and sound steps so as to bring about true results, to ensure the highest interests for society as a whole, and to conform to the objective tendency of the era. The scientific determination of the functions of the party and the state originates from the objective need to establish the dialectical relationships between the superstructure and economic base, between the political and economic areas.

Political renovation is aimed at perfecting the political system.

Political renovation in our country, first of all, is separating in a scientific manner the party's leadership function from the state's management function. Second, gradually broadening democracy within the party and in society, in elections, and in issuing decisions and granting the local and basic levels the right to act on their own initiative. Third, renovating the party and state machineries to make them more streamlined and effective. Fourth, renovating the system of cadres and establishing a modern and scientific system of staff. Fifth, strengthening the socialist law in the legislative, executive, and judiciary branches and in the control of directors as the perfected system of socialist social management.

The most difficult thing to do is to clearly show that the party leads the administration but does not act in its place, nor does everything for it or imposes things on it, and that the party leads with policies, principles, and intermediate- and long-term objectives of major policies in domestic and foreign affairs. They are in the form of party programs, strategies, and resolutions. The party's decisions do not directly become administrative orders for society. State organs will study, accept, and turn these decisions into legislative and constitutional decisions and into laws and decrees, which will become the people's action. The state's decisions, following their promulgation, will take effect in the entire society, which includes the party machinery and all party members. This way we fulfill the following idea: "The party leads the state but operates within the framework of the constitution and the law of the state. Party organs at all levels do not 'issue orders' nor do things that are within the authority of the state to do."¹

The fact that the party leads is also reflected in the control and monitoring of the entire process of carrying out the party's views and the state's policies. In terms of organization, the party does not directly run the legislative, executive, and judiciary machineries. Through its own organizational system the party carries out the controlling task. It achieves this control on the basis of these major principles: to combine the specialized control organs with the mass forces to set up an effective network. It is imperative that the control organs and staff members be controlled. Control is an important link of the management mechanism. It is aimed at making the machinery clean, consolidating this machinery, and contributing to perfecting and developing socialism.

Acting in the capacity of the political vanguard unit, the party is responsible for studying and recommending the most important guidelines in connection with cadre policies and plans. Through its organizational system, the party can find the elite component among the cadres throughout the country and of the worker class and nation, put it in the most important positions in the party, and at the same time introduce it to the state organs and social mass organizations. Realities have

shown that each time we entered a new revolutionary stage, the renovating action among cadres would have an extremely important significance. Our country currently is in the first phase of the period of transition to socialism, but it is facing the tasks that are almost totally new. Consequently, the question of renovating our cadres is being raised in a very urgent manner.

A party function of topmost importance is the theoretical and ideological work. With the complex background as it exists today in the world and in our country, this theoretical and ideological work is related to the very survival of the party, of socialism, and of the political system in our country.

As the result of its leadership role, the renovation of the party itself—particularly the building of the party and the democratization in the party—becomes the decisive link of the entire renovating effort, first of all the political renovation.

The relationships between the party and the masses are the foremost ones that embrace everything else. The party has no other interests than those of the people. It has no other social base than that provided by workers, farmers, intellectuals, and all other working people. It has no other source of strength than the people. Its lofty mission is to lead the people, to make the people take its road, the fine socialist road. Therefore, to improve and strengthen the relationships between the party and the masses and to step up the party's work having to do with the masses is the key part of our work today.

Footnote

1. Nguyen Van Linh: "Further develop the proud traditions, continue to act deservingly of being the political vanguard unit of the entire society," speech delivered at the ceremony marking the 60th anniversary of the establishment of the CPV, 3 February 1990.

MILITARY

Rescue Work Seen as Necessary in Sea Combat

902E0270B Hanoi TAP CHI QUOC PHONG TOAN DAN in Vietnamese Jun 90 pp 34-38, 28

[Article by Medical Doctor Pham Nguyen Pham: "Operations at Sea and Sea Rescue Work"]

[Excerpts] There is extreme emphasis in modern warfare on the role of the sea battlefield. Many foreign strategists have considered the sea as a springboard for aggression, base of departure and excuse for instigating wars to dispute territorial and economic rights at sea. Offensive strikes from the sea often play a decisive role in wars of aggression.

Because Vietnam has more than 3,000 kilometers of seacoast with a system of large and small islands and archipelagoes stretching from north to south, and more than 1 million square kilometers of territorial water and

economic prerogative regions, it is very probable the sea could become an important operational area on which extremely difficult and fierce engagements occur. A necessity in waging combat at sea is sea rescue work. It is a special task and is considered an element of sea engagements.

Sea rescue must solve many problems but its primary mission is to save vessels and personnel. Here, the discussion will deal exclusively with two aspects in organizing the rescue of injured personnel: finding and saving victims adrift at sea and on rivers, and treating those injured and sick personnel. Under any circumstances, sea rescue always follows the principle that finding and rescuing victims must be urgent and swift; assuring prompt and quality treatment. [passage omitted]

In fighting on the mainland, no matter what the task is of reducing the time required for rescuing and treating wounded, it still has many more favorable conditions than at sea. Based on the enemy and war situation, terrain, topography, etc., the frontline military medical service can organize and introduce forces to rescue and transport the wounded, surgical teams, instruments, medicines and even regimental and division dispensaries close to the front. Every individual, force, means and methods from the rudimentary to the modern can directly or indirectly participate in the rescue task. The wounded, to whatever degree, can receive preliminary emergency aid from themselves or their comrades in arms before being taken back for treatment. The work of finding, rescuing, and treating personnel is an interconnected state under conditions of mutual and positive support. At sea however, the situation is entirely different. The rescue of injured personnel is divided into two clear stages; and is dependent upon a great many subjective and objective factors.

In rescue at sea, if no means of transportation exist (ships, boats, aircraft, etc.), saving victims is impossible. The slight injuries of a person floating on the sea, washed ashore an island, etc., will become serious without prompt treatment. When a victim is brought aboard a boat or ship without the proper equipment, medicines, and treatment, his injuries will also easily develop complications. In the empty topography of combat at sea, vessels easily suffer casualties and find it difficult to provide mutual protection, emergency aid, and rescue. When a ship is damaged, an entire collective must be rescued. Medical capabilities aboard ships and boats are not identical and there is no fixed treatment structure. Any small change in the climate, weather, battle situation, combat forces and locations, etc. creates no small adverse effect on sea rescue work, and can prolong the time required for rescue and cause losses to rise. [passage omitted]

Recalling our experience in the rescue of wounded military personnel at sea by coastal provinces during the fight against American aircraft striking the north, we organized a fairly tight and continuous sea rescue net;

highly developed coordination between military and civilian medical services, and between rescue on shore with that at sea; and used every means of rudimentary transportation with all kinds of small boats, sailboats, motorboats, fishing boats, etc., with slow speeds, extremely little and poor rescue equipment, and tiny and weak support and protection forces to conduct sea rescue work in support of combat by the People's Navy. Throughout the war, wounded military personnel at sea were basically found and rescued in a timely manner. When brought ashore, there were emergency aid stations of the people's air defense deployed along the coast and rivers to provide swift treatment, treat their wounds and transfer them to the closest area hospital with no other intermediate stops. When necessary, provincial and district hospitals sent specialized surgical teams to augment army aid stations or down to ships and boats to treat the wounded. This was a good way of organizing sea rescue. However, we must also note that the war at that time was of a single form, ships and boats against American aircraft. The combat usually occurred near shore and at the mouths of rivers; during days of good weather and favorable seas; with some support and protection from the multilayered coastal air defense fire network, etc.

Nevertheless, in such a "small and isolated guerrilla" type of sea rescue, there also occurred not a few impediments. At times, no boats or ships were available to transport the wounded (the Gianh River in November 1964, and Haiphong on 16 April 1972). Motorboats and other vessels were available but their superstitious owners would not transport the wounded and dead (Bai Chay on 5 August 1964). High seas and wind, head winds, etc. prevented sailboats from putting to sea (Quynh Luu in 1968). Especially, the farther from shore the more danger there is to rescuers. They must "dodge bombs and bullets" en route and occasionally suffer more dead and wounded than the personnel being rescued. When combat occurs far from the coast, on islands, etc., the task of rescuing wounded personnel at sea reveals increasingly greater weak points that must be swiftly overcome. In combat during the Spring of 1975, during the liberation of Truong Sa [Spratly Islands], the islands in the southwest, etc., in the transportation of wounded personnel to the mainland, some died en route (Truong Sa-Da Nang), some suffered serious complications from their wounds (southwestern islands-Can Tho), etc. Especially in the fight against encroachment in Truong Sa during March 1988, our sea rescue work was truly passive with fairly low results.

This is not yet mentioning the fact that any combat in our sea area in the future would be a total-force and combined fight of many services and branches, many forces, and many heavy, modern and diverse weapons of great destructive power; and vessels participating in combat would be of many different types capable of great speeds. Combat could occur in all situations and conditions of weather, everywhere at the same time, both near and far from the coast, and with extremely rapid and complex changes. Losses in ships, boats and equipment would increase; the number of personnel requiring

rescue would be much greater and their injuries would be more serious and complex. Sea rescue forces would have to shoulder a heavier and more difficult and dangerous responsibility. At that time, sea rescue work must be totally developed to answer the requirements and missions set forth.

Following are some opinions on sea rescue organization:

Search and rescue organization. In sea rescue, we should not consider "self-rescue primary" but must consider "support" as extremely important, indispensable and occasionally decisive. This very point is the singularity of sea rescue work. To speak of support in sea rescue means the need for means of transportation such as: ships, boats, aircraft, etc. At the present time, while the country's economic situation is encountering many difficulties, budget expenditures for national defense are still restricted, etc., although forces of the navy and air force are making many efforts, they cannot have sufficient means to thoroughly and completely answer the support requirements of sea rescue work. The course for solving this problem is to establish sea rescue organizations with coordination between the army and state, from the central government to local areas along the coast.

Coastal localities must study and establish sea rescue boat and ship units. This force can be separately organized or placed within the offshore operations formation of the defense area. Their primary mission would be to search for, rescue and possibly provide preliminary emergency aid to victims in engagements against enemy amphibious landings, in sea battles occurring 20 to 25 kilometers offshore, etc. This is the range ensuring that most local ships and boats with speeds of 10 to 12 kilometers per hour would have sufficient time to search for, rescue and promptly transport wounded personnel back to the coast within the time stipulated by the medical service. This does not rule out cases in which a province with many larger and faster ships and boats able to put to sea under complex weather conditions can organize rescue vessels to undertake the search for and rescue of wounded personnel in areas 40 to 50 kilometers off the coast, or support other combat areas off the coast of neighboring provinces. These vessels must have plans for augmenting specialized rescue forces, equipment and instruments when combat occurs; a regular program of training and practice; a plan for coordinating and using the ship and boat forces of services and branches operating at sea to support, escort and protect rescue vessels engaged in their mission, etc. How the coordination of operational actions and organizational and command systems during both peacetime and wartime of these forces is conducted requires immediate, specific and firm unity between the Ministry of National Defense, forces operating at sea and localities in defense areas.

To support engagements occurring on distant islands, in remote sea regions, locations exceeding the capabilities of local rescue forces, and to support large sea battles, it is necessary to establish a nationwide general sea rescue

group or one for each area. This is an agency specialized in sea rescue work; with a nucleus force of naval and air force personnel with participation of the state and economic agencies and sectors associated with the sea and with transportation means operating at sea. The group must possess large vessels, capable of distant sea travel and fully equipped to conduct rescues in high seas; and able to fight immediately when hostilities occur.

The primary mission of the sea rescue group must first of all be to support combat, and in peacetime to support the national economy. During wartime, depending on the operational mission and armed activities at sea, a plan is needed to deploy forces consistent with the capabilities and strong points of each ship, locality, primary level unit, etc. During peacetime, the group would be decentralized, reassigned and divided among regions to ensure sea rescue in support of economic activities, with progress toward search and rescue service for international ships operating in regions of the South China Sea under Vietnamese sovereignty.

Establishment of sea rescue groups is also primarily to confirm that sea rescue work during the present situation is not only a specialized, absolute and separate job of naval, air force and military medical personnel but must become a common task of the state and the many ministries, sectors and provinces associated with the sea. Only in this manner will sea rescue forces have the capability, strength and conditions necessary to fulfill their mission in combat and well as peace in support of economic activities. Moreover, it is necessary to develop the strength of people's war to protect the fatherland, possibly establishing an association of volunteers participating in sea rescue work (like the Red Cross). The purpose, objective and mission of our association will require additional study.

Organization of emergency treatment. If personnel are injured at sea, the best course is to rescue and deliver them ashore for treatment. However, because every injured person cannot be brought ashore, means for on-site surgery and professional first aid (on ships, islands, etc.) is an aspect requiring concern and attention.

When speaking of surgery at sea, we usually think first of a "hospital ship" with modern equipment, basic and specialized operating tables, etc. Our actual capabilities at the present time do not permit us to do this. [passage omitted]

In the battles fought in the Spring of 1975, in island liberation, we were able, if prior preparations were made, to perform surgery on wounded personnel aboard transport vessels in the process of moving them to shore. Because we had air and sea control at that time, emergency treatment aboard ship was extremely convenient.

On distant islands, the public health sector long ago deployed surgical teams. Of importance is that these teams operate precisely in accordance with their name, meaning to perform basic surgery and a number of truly

necessary specialized operations that are often required in warfare at sea. Don't let something occur like that at X where a doctor was dispatched to each main island but because we failed to prepare and fully ensure professional, transportation, equipment, medicine, etc. requirements, while the doctor was able to perform appendectomies, someone had to wire the mainland for emergency aid for a hand injury suffered in an accident. The vessel providing emergency aid took weeks! Luckily it was not a serious injury requiring an immediate operation within six to 10 hours!

Coordination between military and civilian medical services in the war to protect the fatherland is always necessary on the coast as well as the islands. The military medical service, to provide effective emergency aid, must select beforehand operating teams with high technical standards, prior training in sea movements and operations, and in the development of surgical teams aboard ship and on islands with conditions differing from those on the coast. The civilian medical service must develop additional experience from the war to resist American imperialist destruction in the north in which a number of civilian hospitals such as Quang Ninh, Viet-Tiep (Haiphong), etc. organized and dispatched specialized surgical teams to support islands and ships, to supplement military medical forces when many casualties required treatment, etc. We should continue to develop this tradition and experience with effective application to coastal area, provincial and district hospitals. Sea rescue work should not be allowed to become disorganized and dispersed as at the present time but should receive unified organization by continuous, synchronized and mutually supporting detachments and areas with a unified command, specific and clear work and mission assignments, an appropriate activity mechanism, etc.

General Discusses Need for Experience, Usage 902E0270A Hanoi TAP CHI QUOC PHONG TOAN DAN in Vietnamese Jun 90 pp 29-33

[Article by Major General Nguyen Nam Hong: "Some Thoughts on Use of Artillery"]

[Text] Through 44 years of construction and combat, the artillery branch has matured, developed and gradually affirmed its role as the primary ground firepower of the army and people's armed forces. In conjunction with the process of staff and equipment organization and rational force construction, study and unceasing perfection of the art of using Vietnamese artillery to answer the operational requirements of the new period, consistent with the practical situation, is a problem of extremely important significance to our army and to the artillery troops themselves.

As part of the military art of Vietnamese people's war, the art of artillery use must first of all have a thorough understanding of the fundamental viewpoints of military art under present conditions with a primary theme of

using a little to win a lot, the weak to strike the strong, high quality to defeat great numbers, and the creation of composite strength to strike and defeat heavily armed and equipped aggressors.

The use of artillery in people's war to protect the fatherland must inherit the operational experience attained by the artillery during people's wars of liberation while simultaneously studying and creatively applying military theory and science to modern warfare, closely connected with Vietnamese practice, to find the most consistent, practical and effective methods of attack for Vietnamese artillery. The central issue is to seek the most superior formula for successfully resolving the relationship between requirements and increasingly higher missions under the actual artillery conditions of limited guns and ammunition, means of observation, command and mobility that are still extremely lacking and unsynchronized, etc. This may be called an extremely difficult problem; and finding a solution is a process of extensive study.

Conditions do not exist for this article to specifically and directly answer all the problems but only to present some initial thoughts on a number of relationships requiring proper resolution.

1. Relationship between independent and joint artillery attacks.

One great success is that our people's wars have confirmed and further enriched the two basic methods of attack by artillery: independent and joint attacks. Both methods originate from the viewpoint and art of people's war, closely connected with the determination and strategic and tactical mission during each war period and actual situation of our army. In war, they have supported and supplemented each other, and depending on the specific situation and objective, independent or joint attacks have been conducted in various locations and instances.

Joint attack is the primary method of artillery attack at the present time. It is consistent with the development pattern of people's war; advancing from small and isolated engagements to joint attacks and campaigns to annihilate group by group or major force component of the enemy aimed at gradually and favorably changing the balance of power between the enemy and us, to a successful conclusion of the war.

In war to protect the fatherland, the operational art of the artillery must not only successfully respond to the battles and joint campaigns of main force corps [binh doan] but also satisfy with high effectiveness the operations of defense forces in the already prepared combat village dispositions of local people's war. Under any condition, the artillery is confirmed as a primary means of firepower for supporting the successful operations of infantry, tanks and friendly forces. Attacking an enemy superior in forces and equipment, our initial balance of power in war, including the various campaigns and combat, is usually lower. Therefore, artillery use

demands the full utilization of every force, piece of equipment and means, and development of every capability aimed at creating the composite strength of the artillery, finding the most effective method of attack, and gradually changing the balance of power between the enemy and us, especially in the primary course of campaigns and combat.

To create the composite strength of artillery, we must know how to fully utilize the strength of people's war to strike the enemy from a position of prepared defenses. Firmly coordinate the use of artillery of defense units with that of main force corps, artillery within the table of organization and equipment, and artillery reinforcements to increase the artillery force component, and create an artillery disposition that is both concentrated and widespread.

At the present time, artillery firepower capabilities, compared with mission requirements, are extremely low. To overcome this situation, it is necessary to concentrate artillery use on primary missions and objectives. When attacking enemy troops defending a position, the mission of supporting a successful tank and infantry attack is considered primary and foremost; restraining and suppressing the artillery and other important targets of the enemy is a primary and regular mission; and inflicting casualties upon and halting counterattacking enemy troops and providing support for our forces in defeating enemy counterattacks is a primary and salient mission during each point in time, requiring concentration on successful achievement. With the primary mission above, three primary artillery objectives appear: fire points and fortifications in breaches, artillery pieces and mortars, and counterattacking enemy infantry and tanks.

In the defense, the missions of supporting the infantry in attacking the enemy and maintaining our primary defensive area; and providing support for forces to counterattack, strike and defeat enemy troops and restore emplacements are the two primary missions. The mission of restraining and suppressing enemy artillery is constant throughout the operational process. From this, the primary objectives of artillery in the defense are confirmed to be enemy infantry, tanks, artillery pieces, and mortars. Knowing how to correctly define and concentrate on the primary missions and objectives, under conditions in which artillery fire capabilities are still limited, to strike and defeat the greatest strength of the enemy is something requiring concentrated thought by the artillery at the present time.

In a war to protect the fatherland, joint operations can occur from the very beginning, but is the independent attack method of the artillery restricted? Under what new conditions is it necessary to study and develop its effect? It is especially necessary to develop the widespread independent attack method of artillery forces deployed in the defensive area of people's war.

It must be acknowledged that independent attack is a highly dangerous and effective method, using little to win a lot, small to win big, striking whatever presents itself, and creating a state of attack by widespread and continuous firepower on the battlefield. Independent attack has combat and campaign value, and often attains results of strategic value under circumstances in which our artillery strikes strategic targets such as airfields, command and communications centers, rocket emplacements, troop concentrations, etc., located deep within the enemy's rear area, and forcing them to change their entire military deployment along one battlefield course. During the war of resistance against the Americans, especially while they were waging a limited war, our artillery forces had not yet developed and independent attack arose, became the universal method of attack, and achieved high effectiveness. The ratio of independent attack during that period accounted for 60 percent of total attacks; rising to 80 percent in 1969. The artillery strikes on the airfields of Bien Hoa, Da Nang and Chu Lai, Dong Lam Base, the Nha Be fuel dump, etc. during that period and more than 1,600 independent artillery attacks during the general attack and uprising in the Spring of 1968 produced extremely high results.

However, it is necessary these days to understand "independent attack" with a "relative" meaning. Independent attacks by artillery usually must be located within overall strategic, campaign and combat supervision. Opportunities, targets and force use must follow one unified plan with thorough preparation before strikes can develop effectiveness. Recently, not a few misuses of independent attack with "flexible" use of artillery have occurred, firing without plans or prior preparations, wasting ammunition and attaining few results.

2. Relationship between shoulder-carried and vehicular-towed artillery.

This is a division of artillery by the means of mobility and transportation and partially the function and effect of each artillery type for proper use during the new situation. Our artillery has grown from shoulder-carried pieces to vehicular-towed and mechanized artillery. During nearly the entire war of resistance against France, we predominantly used shoulder-carried artillery to support the infantry in engagements and campaigns (with the exception of the Hoa Binh campaign in which two 105mm vehicular-towed artillery pieces were used). In a number of attacks, this type of artillery served an accompanying artillery function. It was not until the Dien Bien Phu campaign that the first vehicular-towed artillery regiments of our army appeared; a new change in the artillery fire capabilities of that period.

In the war of resistance against America, during the initial period, our artillery pieces on the southern battlefield were also primarily shoulder-carried. In 1968, in the Khe Sanh campaign, our forces began to use vehicular-towed artillery to participate in joint-branch operations. After that, beginning with 1972, we employed the widespread use of towed artillery on the battlefields in

campaigns of strategic attack, attaining new development in artillery use. Although vehicular-towed artillery developed, the role of shoulder-carried artillery retained an extremely important role that mechanized artillery could never replace. During the campaigns, the ratio of shoulder-carried artillery in the firepower system remained fairly high: during the 1972 Quang Tri campaign: 350 shoulder-carried pieces and 20 towed artillery pieces; and during the 1972 northern Central Highlands campaign: 121 towed artillery pieces and 192 shoulder pieces. The widespread use of shoulder-carried artillery is an expression of our army's close-attack ideology.

After 1975, the artillery of our army has developed a balance of both shoulder-carried and vehicular-towed artillery with an increase in towed artillery of five times the level of the Ho Chi Minh campaign. In the artillery division at the present time, towed artillery occupies a high percentage—figured by the firepower battery. Under conditions of preparations in every aspect in the war to protect the fatherland, with superior range and power, prompt mobility, large forces organized in a fairly rational manner, vehicular-towed artillery has truly become the backbone of campaign and combat ground firepower for conducting prompt and effective support during joint operations and dealing various levels of firepower following the independent attack method. However, weaknesses such as the handling of difficulties, especially movement under the complex terrain conditions in our country, have also generated definite limitations in the use of vehicular-towed artillery.

Shoulder-carried artillery, with its superiorities of simplicity, light weight, easy movement by manpower over all types of terrain, uncomplicated combat use, convenient deployment and existence in the table of organization and equipment of infantry battalions and regiments, is still the type of accompanying artillery providing timely and competent support to the infantry under all combat conditions, especially in locations and instances in which vehicular-towed artillery is unable to participate. Shoulder-carried artillery must also be provided to local armed forces in defensive areas to form forces of on-site artillery, conducting widespread and timely attacks on the enemy by many creative, rich and flexible forms, and those in joint operations as well as independent attacks by the artillery. The coordinated use of artillery types is an art of regulatory nature aimed at creating the composite strength and integral firepower disposition of the artillery. Only with the correct use of new functions can the effect of each type of artillery in the overall firepower disposition be developed. Occurrences of only giving concern to or neglecting one direction and of mutual dependence are erroneous, and usually lead to a reduced effectiveness of artillery in combat.

3. Relationship between fire effectiveness and ammunition expenditure.

Fire effectiveness is the measurement of artillery combat results and is created by the factors of: fire organization

and the application of firing methods and capabilities to ensure ammunition. Under our present situation, the requirement to achieve high fire effectiveness with the lowest ammunition expenditure is becoming one of the guiding ideologies of artillery use. This requirement is seemingly contradictory but bears an extremely close unity. This is not subjective or voluntarist thinking but originates from an objective reality of the situation of our artillery equipment and combat assurance in which many difficulties have been encountered without resolution over many years. We must accept combat under conditions of artillery and ammunition shortages without reducing combat efficiency.

The problem of organizing artillery fire in operations, especially joint operations, must be contemplated and renovated. This is the most essential link in the art of artillery use. Artillery fire organization must satisfy the attack methods of combined branch troops and of forces in the defensive area, develop fire effectiveness, and be consistent with our artillery and ammunition conditions. Recent study has resulted in many renovations, especially in the organization of firepower during the state of preparing offensive firepower. Apply precious experience from the offensive campaigns of liberation war on defining fire missions, requirements and targets for casualty infliction and property destruction and firepower structure, and stipulate firing times to organize and prepare firepower consistent with the practical situation at the present time.

It is necessary to develop attack methods with the strong points of moving artillery in close, conducting directly aimed fire and raising effectiveness while expending little ammunition. With the same target, if directly aimed artillery fire is used, only one-tenth the ammunition used in indirectly aimed fire is expended. However, in the conditions of war at the present time, we are not always able to widely develop directly aimed artillery fire. Moreover, is it increasingly impossible to use only directly aimed artillery fire as a total replacement for indirectly aimed fire because each firing method has a different effect on different types of targets. Promotion of study in methods of effective indirectly aimed artillery fire in the present situation is extremely essential.

Study in the use of methods to effectively fire on targets that observers can see and direct fire instead of firing on unobserved targets has reduced ammunition expenditures by one fourth. A firepower structure with prepared artillery fire, primarily using destructive fire coordinated with short barrages, differing from before when only barrages were conducted, has produced high results and conserved ammunition. The bold use of artillery batteries as the universal firepower component, and firing on specific targets in the field instead of targets delineated by area are firing method renovations aimed at achieving the requirement of high fire effectiveness and the lowest level of ammunition expenditure. This is also a premise for study to find the most effective firing methods and firepower use for Vietnamese artillery in the present situation.

ECONOMIC

VIETSOUPETRO Facing New Challenges, Competition

902E0252A Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG
in Vietnamese 26 Jun 90 pp 1, 3

[Article by Trieu Xuan: "Vietnam-Soviet Oil-Gas Joint Enterprise Faces New Challenges"]

[Text] Editor's Note: The Vietnam-Soviet Oil-Gas Joint Enterprise (VIETSOUPETRO) has for the past eight years explored for and produced oil off the coast at Vung Tau. The people of the entire nation have paid much attention to the partnership with the Soviet Union to produce oil and gas. At a time when the Vietnamese economy is undergoing many upheavals, and especially when the political situation in eastern Europe is extremely complicated, as at present, a question that is posed is how VIETSOUPETRO will operate. What is its future? The journalist Trieu Xuan, a special correspondent for SAIGON GIAI PHONG, interviewed comrade Bui Hai Ninh, First Deputy Director of VIETSOUPETRO, regarding those questions.

[Trieu Xuan] Tell us about the present situation of VIETSOUPETRO.

[Bui Hai Ninh] In accordance with an agreement signed by Vietnam and the Soviet Union, VIETSOUPETRO was formed at the end of 1981 and officially began operations at the beginning of 1982. In 1985 we discovered oil and in 1986 began to produce it. By the end of May 1990 the Joint Enterprise had produced 3.5 million tons of crude oil. With 5,000 employees, 80 percent of whom are Vietnamese, VIETSOUPETRO now has rather strong material bases for exploring for and producing oil and gas on the continental shelf off Vung Tau. VIETSOUPETRO has drilled many wells, 90 percent of which have found oil. However, from the point of discovering oil to determining reserves for industrial production accurate studies must be carried out. At present, in the Bach Ho oil field VIETSOUPETRO has more than 50 wells and seven operating drilling platforms. On average, every day we pump 8,000 tons of crude oil, worth U.S. \$1 million.

[Trieu Xuan] Some people believe that the partnership with the Soviet Union is very inefficient in producing oil and gas.

[Bui Hai Ninh] It is necessary to understand that matter scientifically. When evaluating efficiency, it is necessary to take a long-range view, for in the case of oil and gas, the emphasis is on investing capital. It takes several additional years to determine whether there will be profit or loss. At VIETSOUPETRO there are preconditions for estimating rather clearly whether there will be loss or profit. Here I would like to add that the investment of capital by VIETSOUPETRO depends on geological factors, depth, distance from shore, production potential, the price of equipment, the selling price of oil,

specialized abilities, technical abilities, etc. I emphasize the modern nature of the equipment and production technology, and the skills of the producers. If, during the last decade of this century, we must produce with equipment of the 50's and 60's, how can productivity be high? At VIETSOUPETRO we observe a norm: production expenses account for 30 to 35 percent of the value of oil produced. Thus 65 to 70 percent of the income from oil is paid to the Vietnamese state and divided between the two parties of the joint enterprise. Therefore, with that norm the Vietnam-Soviet joint enterprise is profitable. That has been proven. We are endeavoring to reduce production expenses to less than 30-35 percent to increase profits. That is a matter of purely economic efficiency. The second aspect of the matter of efficiency is cadre training. During the past eight years of partnership with the Soviet Union, our Soviet friends have trained thousands of high-level specialists and technical cadres. Furthermore, when our joint enterprise began to import equipment from the Western countries and Japan VIETSOUPETRO even trained the Soviet technicians and workers. There were many types of equipment which the Soviet Union did not yet have. It must be emphasized that only in partnership with the Soviet Union could we train technical cadres and workers. As for cooperation with capitalist corporations, they only know how to produce. After the contract has been fulfilled they leave. It is certain that they would not train us free of charge.

[Trieu Xuan] I agree with you that we are able to train oil and gas cadres and workers because of that cooperation, but the question is at what level or with which standards the training should be carried out. Are the international standards applicable?

[Bui Hai Ninh] The Soviet Union has sent skilled technicians to Vung Tau. They have gone all-out in guiding the Vietnamese side.

[Trieu Xuan] Does VIETSOUPETRO have the right to decide the purchasing of equipment and the selling price of crude oil? My understanding is that it does not.

[Bui Hai Ninh] It is true that in past years, in accordance with the spirit of the agreement signed in 1981, the Vietnam-Soviet Oil and Gas Joint Enterprise has not had full authority regarding the purchasing of equipment and the setting of crude oil prices. That is the responsibility of another agency. In Vietnam that agency is the Petechim Oil and Equipment Export-Import Corporation.

[Trieu Xuan] I believe that is the key question. The importing and exporting of oil are controlled by others. Do you think that is irrational?

[Bui Hai Ninh] Yes, that is a very great irrationality which must be eliminated immediately when VIETSOUPETRO begins the phase of complete cost accounting. In past years we had to endure that irrationality, which greatly affected the calculation of efficiency. For example, a Soviet drill bit is worn out after drilling only

300 meters. With the same amount of dollars we could buy a drill bit from another country that would drill about 400-500 meters. The time has come to completely change the existing subsidy mechanism at VIETSOUPETRO. If not, it's true that the result will be very low efficiency.

[Trieu Xuan] Please tell us about the future orientation of VIETSOUPETRO.

[Bui Hai Ninh] At a time when the economies of Vietnam and the Soviet Union are changing over to a new mechanism, VIETSOUPETRO cannot continue to work in the old subsidy mode. The outline agreement signed by the two countries on 6 September 1981 is no longer appropriate. We are now urgently changing over to the cost accounting mechanism. We have reorganized: instead of 10 deputy directors there are now only five, and instead of the original work force of 8,000 there are now only 5,000. The number of offices and departments has been cut in half. The joint enterprise is responsible for purchasing equipment and selling oil. Even the employment of workers by the two sides must be carefully recalculated.

In sum, when implementing the new mechanism we must make correct and full calculations, so we must weigh the pros and cons carefully so that the money we spend is not wasted. We will give priority to modernizing equipment and attaining the international technological level. It is certain that in the last decade of this century VIETSOUPETRO will achieve greater results. At present, in the 1990 plan year, we must attain and surpass 2.5 million tons of crude oil.

[Trieu Xuan] There are now eight capitalist countries exploring for and producing oil in the territorial waters of Vietnam. That means VIETSOUPETRO has competition.

[Bui Hai Ninh] It is certain that VIETSOUPETRO will not do badly. We understand and believe in our capabilities once we have thought and acted with our own heads.

Coffee Exports to Non-Communist Countries

90P30097A

[Editorial Report] The 4 August issue of the Hanoi daily NHAN DAN reported that the Vietnam Union of Coffee Enterprises exported 12,034 tons of coffee in the first six months of 1990. Export shipments were made not only to Eastern European countries, but also to several other new and non-communist clients such as France, India, Italy, Japan, and the FRG. Coffee exports amounted to 18,198,434 rubles and dollars during this same period and, according to the paper, were profitable.

NHAN DAN attributes the success of the union's recent efforts to a reorganization in the spirit of "doi moi" [renovation]: the VINACAPHE Coffee Export Company was dissolved and replaced by a new export office staffed with experienced cadres. In addition, three new coffee export companies, directly subordinate to the union, were set up in Hanoi, Nha Trang, and Ho Chi Minh City.

BIOGRAPHIC

Information on Personalities 90P30095A

[Editorial Report] The following information on Vietnamese personalities has been extracted from Vietnamese language sources published in Hanoi, unless otherwise indicated. An asterisk indicates that this is the first known press reference to this individual functioning in this capacity.

Chau Dieu Ai [CHAAU ZIEUJ AIS], Colonel, Ph.D.

Director of the Penal Science Institute (vien khoa hoc hinh su); he was mentioned in an article on renovation in the People's Police General Department. (NHAN DAN 6 Jun 90 p 3)

Do An [DOOX AN]

*Chairman of the People's Committee, Hai Phong Municipality; his article on renovation in Hai Phong was published in the cited source. (NHAN DAN 6 Jun 90 p 1)

Dang Can [DAWNGJ CAAN], Colonel

Head of the Military Staff Department (Cuc tham muu), People's Police General Department, Ministry of the Interior; he was mentioned in an article on renovation of the People's Police General Department. (NHAN DAN 6 Jun 90 p 3)

Nguyen Van Coc [NGUYEENX VAWN COOCS], air force hero, Colonel

Recently he welcomed a group of U.S. veterans-writers visiting Vietnam. (HANOI MOI 29 Jun 90 p 4)

Mua Thi Di [MUAF THIJ ZIS]

Vice chairman of the People's Committee, Lai Chau Province; recently she toured her province to help flood victims. (NHAN DAN 6 Aug 90 p 1)

Ha Quang Du [HAF QUANG ZUWJ]

First secretary of the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union Central Committee; his article "Continue the Process of Renovation" was published in the cited source. (TAP CHI CONG SAN Jun 90 p 9)

Nguyen Ngoc Dinh [NGUYEENX NGOCJ DINHX]

*Member of the CPV [Communist Party of Vietnam] Standing Committee, Hanoi Municipality; on 29 Jun 90 he attended a conference held by his organization on efforts to purify and strengthen the contingent of party members. (HANOI MOI 30 Jun 90 p 1)

Phan Hien [PHAN HIEENF]

Minister of justice; recently he signed a cooperation agreement with an LPDR delegation visiting Vietnam. (NHAN DAN 3 Aug 90 p 4)

Dang Huu [DAWNGJ HUWUX]

Head of the Vietnam Science Commission; recently he attended the opening ceremony for a conference on consumers protection in Hanoi. (HANOI MOI 6 Aug 90 p 1)

Hoang Thi Khanh [HOANGF THIJ KHANH]

*Chairwoman of the Ho Chi Minh City Federation of Labor Unions; on 5 Aug 90 she presented a report on the socioeconomic situation in Ho Chi Minh City to Council of Ministers Chairman Do Muoi when he visited her organization. (NHAN DAN 7 Aug 90 p 1)

Nguyen Minh Khanh [NGUYEENX MINH KHANHS], Engineer, Lieutenant Colonel

*Deputy CPV secretary of the People's Police General Department, Ministry of the Interior; he was mentioned in an article on party construction. (NHAN DAN 6 Jul 89 p 3)

Vu Khoan [VUX KHOAN]

*Vice minister of foreign affairs; his article "Ho Chi Minh, an Outstanding Diplomat" was published in the cited source. (TAP CHI CONG SAN May 90 p 24)

Chu Duy Kinh [CHU ZUY KINHS], Lieutenant General

*Commander of the Capital MR; on 26 Mar 90 he attended a meeting to commemorate the 55th anniversary of the militia and self-defense forces. (HANOI MOI 27 Mar 90 p 1)

Ho The Lan [HOOF THEER LAN]

*Head of the Information and Press Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; on 2 Aug 90 she held a press conference on the meeting between the SRV ambassador to the UN and U.S. officials in New York. (NHAN DAN 3 Aug 90 p 4)

Trinh Xuan Lang [TRINHJ XUAAN LANGX]

Ambassador, head of the SRV Permanent Delegation at the UN; on 2 Aug 90 he met with Mr. Quinn, U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state, in New York. (HANOI MOI 3 Aug 90 p 1)

Tran Luan [TRAANF LUAAN]

Deputy head of the Ho Chi Minh City Organ of Control; his article about his organization was published in the cited source. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 2 Aug 90 p 2)

Tran Cong Man [TRAANF COONG MAAN]

*Deputy secretary general of Vietnam Journalists Association; his article "When the Press Is the People's Forum" was published in the cited source. (TAP CHI CONG SAN Jun 90 p 47)

Hoang Duc Nghi [HOANGF DUWCS NGHI]

*Minister in charge of mountain regions and nationalities; recently he was released from the position of minister of supply and appointed to the above position. (NHAN DAN 2 Apr 90 p 1)

Dong Si Nguyen [DOONGF SIX NGUYEEN]

Vice chairman of the Council of Ministers; on 29 Jul 90 he worked with the Ho Chi Minh City People's Committee to stabilize rice prices in the city. (NHAN DAN 2 Aug 90 p 1)

Phan Quang [PHAN QUANG]

General director of the Voice of Vietnam radio; on 27 Jul 90 he signed a cooperation document between Australia and Vietnam. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 29 Jul 90 p 1)

Bui Xuan Son [BUIF XUAAN SOWN]

CPV secretary of Ha Nam Ninh Province; he was mentioned in an article on a discussion in Nam Dinh City on strengthening the people's trust of the Party. (NHAN DAN 8 Aug 90 p 3)

Doan Duy Thanh [DOANF ZUY THANHF]

By a recent decision of the State Council, he was relieved from the position of minister of external economic relations for a new assignment. (NHAN DAN 2 Apr 90 p 1)

Duong Dinh Thao [ZUWOWNG DINHF THAOR]

Head of the Propaganda and Training Committee, Ho Chi Minh City; on 21 Jun 90 he attended a meeting held in Ho Chi Minh City to commemorate Vietnam Press Day. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 22 Jun 90 p 1)

Hoang Hong That [HOANGF HOONGF THAATS]

*Vice chairman of the Vietnam Peasants Association; on 2-3 Aug 90 he chaired a conference on rural development. (NHAN DAN 4 Aug 90 p 1)

Trinh Thanh Thiep [TRINHJ THANH THIEEPJ], Colonel

*Permanent deputy director of the People's Police General Department (pho tong cuc truong thuong truc tong cuc canh sat nhan dan); he was mentioned in an article on renovation work in his organization. (NHAN DAN 6 Jun 90 p 3)

Tran Van Thong [TRAANF VAWN THOONG]

CPV secretary of Son Tay town; he was mentioned in an article on surplus labor in his town. (HANOI MOI 7 Aug 90 p 3)

Pham Chanh Truc [PHAMJ CHANHS TRUWCJ]

*Vice chairman of the People's Committee, Ho Chi Minh City; on 18 Jun 90 he attended the inauguration ceremony for the Australian chamber of commerce in Ho Chi Minh City. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 19 Jun 90 p 1)

Nguyen Van Tu [NGUYEENX VAWN TUW]

Chairman of the Vietnam Confederation of Labor Unions; he headed a delegation to visit Laos from 26 Jul to 2 Aug 90. (NHAN DAN 6 Aug 90 p 1)

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